Do Israelis from Arab countries weaken democracy?

Those who condemn the Israel of Likud, Shas and Israel Beiteinu for being undemocratic point to the pre-1967 days as the flowering of Western-German-Jewish democracy.

On the heels of the recent September 13 Time magazine cover that purports to show why Israelis don’t care about peace, Roger Cohen of The New York Times wrote an oddly timed op-ed about the very same topic (“Israelis have better things to do than dream of peace).

In his redundant article he included a quote from the author and journalist Tom Segev: “They really don’t believe in peace, and the million recent arrivals from the former Soviet Union didn’t bring democratic values. Democracy is weaker.”

Segev’s comment about the Russian- Israelis, as if they are “recent” arrivals, when they have been here 20 years now, is surprising.

What is more interesting is why he choose to slander the entire Russian community and single it out for the supposed weakening of democracy. What are these “democratic values” that Israel had before 1990 and that are sorely lacking today? The condemnation of the Russians for ruining democratic Israel is reminiscent of a December 2004 interview in Haaretz with journalist and writer Amos Elon by Ari Shavit.

Elon, who was then living in “exile” in Italy because he had become estranged from the Israel that had provided him with fame and luxury, called the country a “quasi-fascist” state with “religious people [who] would be better off behind bars and not in politics.”

He complained that Israel was no longer a democratic Western country, and summed up his views with: “There was provinciality here. [in Israel]. There was this upstart’s arrogance.

I’m not surprised when you look at the population. We know where it comes from. Either from the Arab countries or from Eastern Europe.”

Here Elon adds the category of Jews from “Arab countries” to the reasons why Israel became, in his view, a non-Western nondemocratic society. The argument over Israeli society’s lack of democracy thus tends to decline into the realm of blaming “others,” especially immigrants, for taking away the Western democracy that once flourished here.

But it depends partly on the background of the beholder. Segev was born in 1935 to parents who fled Germany that year. His first language was German, which his parents spoke at home. Elon too was born to German- Jewish parents; he explained to Shavit “my parents’ friends were all immigrants from Germany and Austria. The big library at home was all German... But they were really the first free Jews. And the first Europeans.

They built a civil society and believed obsessively in Bildung, which is self-improvement through the fostering of social concerns.”

From the perspective of Segev and Elon, who in many ways represent a very strong stream within elite Israeli society, the complaint can be boiled down to the fact that non-German Jews ruined their country. It is an extraordinary insult to the millions of Jews who have come here, especially considering that, far from being haters of democracy, many of them yearned to breath free in the undemocratic states they fled.

The Jews of the Arab countries, whether Lebanon, Egypt, Algeria or Iraq, were almost all firm absorbers of the latest Western ideas in the early 20th century. Some of them became ardent socialists before they became Zionists, if they became Zionists at all. The Jews of the Soviet Union, especially the refuseniks, were all democrats to the core.

THERE IS a question that must be asked of those like Segev (Elon died in 2009 so he cannot be asked) who believe that it is the Jewish immigrants who came after 1950 that brought nondemocratic values with them.

How democratic was Israel in the old days? Those who condemn the Israel of Likud, Shas and Israel Beiteinu for being undemocratic almost all point to the utopian pre-1967 days as the flowering of Western-German-Jewish democracy.

Let’s recall that Israel for a second. Pre- 1967, this was a one-party state whose government was dominated, since its inception in 1948, by the Labor Party. It was more akin to the democracy found in Italy, Japan or Mexico in that period than in the UK and the US. The democracy of those years is the one that kept Arab communities under military rule, where Arab citizens, although they could vote, faced all sorts of mobility restrictions, including curfews. Pre-1967 was heavy on censorship generally, so much so that the Beatles were banned from coming in 1965 for fear they would corrupt public morality. The Israel of old was undemocratic in its allocation of land to new immigrants and in its treatment of Jews from Arab countries, so much that ethnic riots erupted in Haifa in 1959. It was pre-1967 Israel that crafted a Supreme Court with no checks or balances, and that elects itself – probably the least democratic institution in the country.

This is not to condemn the accomplishments of the old Israel that didn’t include Sephardi, religious, Russian or Ethiopian Jews; surely the pre-immigration Jewish leadership accomplished great things, but they weren’t paragons of democracy, and the arrival of their Jewish cousins after 1950 has done nothing but improve democracy. It was Sephardim who brought the first change in political power, in 1977, and it is Russians, the religious and the Ethiopians, not to mention the Israeli Arabs, who have contributed greatly to the democratic fabric.

The fact that some find this diverse country so abhorrent says more about the “democracy” they wanted, the one that was to be composed only of their colleagues and culturally- linked groups, than it does about the immigrants. Those who call themselves cultured and slander other groups are correct to exile themselves to Europe, which bans the burka and minarets and has proven it is incapable of welcoming outsiders.

Israel may have failed the Western European test by opening its gates wide to people from the Arab, Slavic and African worlds, but it is more democratic for it.

O mundo contra a queima do Corão

Mais:
Somos agora todos súditos dos radicais islâmicos?

Obama e o Alcorão: fraco e pouco inteligente

Blog do Mr. X | 10 Setembro 2010

Se alguém queima a bandeira americana, é protesto legítimo. Se alguém coloca um crucifixo em um balde de urina, é "arte". Se alguém quer construir uma mesquita a poucos passos do maior atentado islâmico da história, é "liberdade de expressão".

Vejam como são as coisas neste mundo. Um obscuro pastor da Flórida, cuja igreja é composta de não mais do que 50 indivíduos, decidiu anunciar publicamente que queimaria um Corão no dia 11 de setembro, afirmando que o Islã seria coisa do Diabo. Cada maluco com sua mania: seria uma cerimônia que não duraria mais do que alguns minutos em uma pequena igreja da Flórida, aberta apenas aos membros.

Porém, o mundo inteiro ergueu-se contra.

Certo, houve os esperados e previamente agendados protestos no mundo islâmico, incluindo a bizarra afirmação dos líderes iranianos de que Israel estaria por trás do evento. Mas mais surpreendentes foram os ataques no mundo não-islâmico. Vejam só:

* A prefeitura da cidade negou ao pastor a permissão de fazer fogo;
* O seu banco cancelou sua hipoteca;
* A companhia de seguros cancelou o seguro à propriedade da Igreja;
* O General Petraeus, comandante das forças no Afeganistão, manifestou-se contrário, afirmando que poria em risco a vida de tropas;
* Hillary Clinton, Secretária de Estado e representante do governo americano, manifestou-se rispidamente contrária;
* Finalmente o próprio presidente americano, Barack Obama, pediu publicamente ao pastor para não queimar o livro;
* O site da Igreja foi cancelado e apagado pelo servidor;
* A Associated Press e a Fox News garantiram a seus espectadores que não mostrariam cenas da queima do livro caso esta ocorresse;
* Colunistas e articulistas, até mesmo à direita, informaram que era uma maluquice, um absurdo, uma loucura.
* A Interpol anunciou que o ato poderia levar a novos atentados.
* O pastor foi finalmente forçado a desistir do ato, em base a uma promessa (depois desmentida) de mudança do local da mesquita de Ground Zero.

É estranho. Se alguém queima a bandeira americana, é protesto legítimo. Se alguém coloca um crucifixo em um balde de urina, é "arte". Se alguém quer construir uma mesquita a poucos passos do maior atentado islâmico da história, é "liberdade de expressão". Bíblias são queimadas até pelo próprio exército americano, como medida politicamente correta. Mas se alguém decidir tacar fogo num Corão, é atacado por toda a humanidade.

Qual a lição do episódio? Acho que as seguintes:

1) A violência funciona. O islamismo intimida e consegue obter o que quer.
2) A esquerda não é a favor da "liberdade de expressão", mas apenas das expressões contrárias ao cristianismo e às tradições ocidentais.
3) A tolerância é a virtude dos fracos, e só convida a mais ataques e provocações.
4) Na era da mídia global, basta realizar um ato polêmico para aparecer e ser notícia até no Kuzakistão.
5) Para alguns, símbolos são mais importantes do que vidas humanas.
6) O politicamente correto domina completamente a mídia e os governos ocidentais, e mesmo muitas das vozes supostamente conservadoras.
7) Acima é abaixo, dentro é fora, preto é branco. O bom senso não existe mais, vivemos em tempos realmente ridículos.


Curiosamente, existe mais de um vídeo no Youtube do Corão sendo queimado. Até agora não foram censurados. Assista enquanto puder.

Refugees: Double standards for Jews and "Palestinians"

The late Edward Said's demand for statehood and the right of return for Palestinian "refugees" implies a double standard for Israelis and Palestinians. The Palestinians can choose between an ethnically homogenous Arab state without Jewish settlements or living in economically attractive Israel. Edward Said, however, does not demand that Israelis be authorized to resettle peacefully in, say, Iraq and Arabs restitute them for property their ancestors abandoned. Many reject the concept of Israel as a purely Jewish state, but the Palestinians do not want Jews in their midst. The same perverse logic is applied to the Jewish settlements: Jewish towns may not exist in the Palestinian territories, even in the religiously sensitive areas for Jews, but the Arabs administer Muslim shrines in Jerusalem, including the Temple Mount, central to Judaism.

The Palestinians want an ethnically homogenous state, no Jews. Edward Said objected to the small Jewish settlement in Hebron whose 450 people “must be made to leave.” But Hebron is significant for religious Jews and has been for three thousand years, not just for the last thirty years that Palestinian Arabs have found Jerusalem important.

Edward Said used to say Israel must apologize for the grief Palestinians suffer, though he does not expect Arabs to regret what they did to Jews for years before the Israeli state was formed in 1948. Professor Said laments the Palestinians who died but excuses the Jews killed by Palestinians before 1948, during the Israeli War of Independence, in the Arab-Israel War of Attrition, in Israeli border shelling, and in Palestinian terrorist attacks. If, on the balance, anyone deserves reparations for lives and property, it is Israel.

Edward Said wanted Israel not only to give away the Palestinian territories to Arabs but also to do so “in humility and reconciliation.” Imagine Mexico asking this much of the United States. Edward Said can concede to “recognizing Israel in our [Arab] midst,” provided Israel resolves certain issues to Said's “minimum satisfaction.” That is nonsensical bravado coming from a defeated Arab enemy. The defeated Palestinians hope to appeal to Israeli Jewish morality after failing with other means.

The Times reviews 'In Ishmael's House'

http://jewishrefugees.blogspot.com/

Martin Gilbert's chronicle of the humiliations heaped upon Jews over 14 centuries of 'coexistence' in the Middle East and North Africa in his new book, In Ishmael's House, is a corrective to the 'conventional wisdom' that Israel is the 'price paid by the Palestinians for European sins against the Jews'. Review in The Times, believed to be by Dominic Lawson.

Jews at the Wailing Wall, Jerusalem, 31st December 1889 (The Bridgeman Art Library)

Our leading historian of the Holocaust, Martin Gilbert, has a particular technique. Devoid of obvious statements of opinion, or even literary style, his method, as he himself describes it, is that of a "tireless gathering of facts". This is most obviously designed to counter the dedicated and persistent Holocaust deniers, who would seize on any rhetorical flourish or subjective assessment by a historian known to be a practising Jew and committed Zionist.(...)

There is, of course, nothing in the history of the Muslims’ oppression of the Jews approaching the industrial programme of mass extermination that took place in 20th-century Europe; and for parts of the period covered by Gilbert, the Ottoman empire offered Jews a safety and security that many Christian countries did not.

Thus he accepts the verdict of Bernard Lewis, in Semites and Anti-Semites, that the experience of Jews living under Islamic rulers was "never as bad as in Christendom at its worst, nor ever as good as in Christendom at its best…there is nothing in Islamic history to parallel the Spanish expulsion and Inquisition, the Russian pogroms, or the Nazi Holocaust".

The minimal obligatory anti-Zionist line in the Middle East — and here, too, as a matter of fact — takes this a stage further, asserting that the UN-backed creation of the state of Israel in 1948 perversely punished the Palestinian Arabs for the anti-semitic sins of Europeans. Gilbert’s latest book is, in essence, a corrective to that view, which now amounts almost to conventional wisdom.

Gilbert starts from the fundamental historical point that the territory once known as Judah was inhabited and in parts ruled by Jews for many centuries before there were any people who could be described as Muslims: Jerusalem had been the Jewish capital for more than 600 years before it was seized by the Babylonians, and the much later triumphant military campaigns of the prophet Muhammad came a millennium after that. As Gilbert points out, deadpan: "Jerusalem, not mentioned in the Koran, is mentioned 654 times in the Hebrew Bible" — a point worth bearing in mind as you read newspaper accounts of the modern Israeli government’s allegedly unreasonable demand to retain control over Jerusalem in any final settlement with the Palestinians.

Nobody can doubt that the indignities heaped on the Palestinian Arabs over the past 60 years have been bitter; but the tale of Gilbert’s book is that of the humiliations heaped on Jews by Muslim rulers over 1,400 years, largely through the subjugation known as "dhimmitude". Under Sharia law, non-Muslims are referred to as "dhimmis", regarded as a lower category of people, and therefore subject to institutionalised discrimination. In many cases the rigorous codes set up to enforce this were more humiliating even than the segregationist rules imposed on black South Africans by the apartheid system.

Gilbert characteristically does not lack for documentation; here, for example, are some of the 22 “dhimmi” regulations imposed specifically on Jews in the Persian city of Hamadan at the end of the 19th century: "Jews…are forbidden to wear matching shoes... If a Muslim insults a Jew, the latter must drop his head and remain silent... The Jew cannot put on his coat; he must be satisfied to carry it rolled under his arm... It is forbidden for Jewish doctors to ride on horseback... Jews must not consume good fruit."

One can see here how much creative effort and imagination were devoted to the pastime of gratuitous humiliation of the Jewish population — one echoed in the Iran of the present day in the law stipulating that if one member of a Jewish family converts to Islam, he can inherit the entire family’s property.

The Zionism of the modern era was the natural political consequence of centuries of such humiliations: not just a biblically sanctioned campaign for the Promised Land, but a realisation that two millenniums of meek acquiescence had never brought acceptance, or even security. That would require a nation that Jews could call their own — and an army to defend them.

Naturally, it seemed incredible to the five Arab armies that launched an attack on the day-old Israeli state in May 1948 that a people they had been taught to regard as the lowest of the low could defeat their combined forces. Azzam Pasha, the secretary of the Arab League, had declared, with macabre relish: "This will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre."

When it turned out that the Jews were not going to be driven into the sea, but indeed were able to defeat the Arab military entirely on their own, the rage throughout the Muslim world was all but uncontrollable: the next few years witnessed savage vicarious reprisals against Jews across the region, most notably in Iraq, where a large Jewish community had existed ever since their original exodus from Jerusalem after the Romans’ destruction of the Second Temple in AD70 (in fact the Babylonian exodus dated back to 586 BC - ed).

In this sense, at least, the scale of the displacement of the Palestinians was partly the result of the Arab world’s own actions. In the four years between 1948 and 1951 a total of 687, 739 Jewish refugees reached Israel; yet as Gilbert points out, only about 100,000 of these were Holocaust survivors from Europe: more than half a million were those fleeing Arab and Muslim lands, giving up all their wealth and property not just to avoid the rage of the mob but also that of the militarily defeated host governments.

More fundamentally, if the Muslim world had accepted UN resolution 181, partitioning the British mandate of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab, then the Middle East might have been at peace these past 60 years. Gilbert’s book explains exactly why such a happy ending was (and is) so improbable.

Read article in full (subscription only)

Financial Times review

Na mesa com o inimigo: é possível negociar com o Islam?

Heitor De Paola | 02 Setembro 2010
Artigos - Movimento Revolucionário

A observação de que o Islam é uma ideologia expansionista é óbvia. Apenas os raros ingênuos ou os abundantes mal intencionados podem dizer que o Islam é somente uma religião como a judaica ou a cristã.

As negociações de paz no Oriente Médio são um exemplo muito claro do que se chama 'guerra assimétrica', no caso negociações assimétricas: Israel quer e precisa de paz, o Islam não quer e nem precisa de paz. Pelo contrário, as negociações de seu lado são apenas um engodo permanente para desviar a atenção de seu real objetivo: a destruição do que eles chamam entidade sionista e a expulsão dos judeus de sua terra.

A observação de que o Islam é uma ideologia expansionista é óbvia. Apenas os raros ingênuos ou os abundantes mal intencionados podem dizer que o Islam é somente uma religião como a judaica ou a cristã. Seria fastidioso repetir aqui o que já tenho dito, e inúmeros outros autores também, a respeito da abrangência do Islam na totalidade da vida dos fiéis. Sugiro a leitura da série Subsídios para entender o Islam (e as bases de sua diplomacia), de minha autoria.

James Lewis publicou recentemente no AMERICAN THINKER um artigo no qual se refere ao Islam como um novo imperialismo fascista e começa dizendo: nada mais parecido com o Eixo fascista da década de 1930 do que o expansionismo islâmico atual. Da mesma forma que o Eixo Hitler-Tojo-Mussolini então, o fascismo islâmico é fundamentalmente imperialista, seguindo uma ordem explícita do Alto para subjugar os povos civilizados ou transformá-los em cinza. O próprio Maomé ameaçou os cultos Imperadores de seu tempo, o Persa e o de Bizâncio e, nos anos seguintes, seus seguidores os invadiram como um exército de formigas devoradoras.

Clifford May, um dos maiores especialistas americanos em terrorismo, aponta a principal razão pela qual o Islam vem se expandindo pelo Ocidente de forma avassaladora sem enfrentar obstáculo algum: o tabu dos intelectuais em dizer claramente o que sabem sobre o expansionismo islâmico, mas evitam comentar, na base de uma política multiculturalista de 'não pergunte-não diga' (don't ask-dont' tell). Os intelectuais preferem morrer a serem considerados fanáticos e intolerantes. A vergonha e o medo que sentem por serem assim considerados é tão grande que arriscam suas próprias vidas defendendo o direito do Islam de ser considerado em igualdade com as religiões civilizadas.

Os muçulmanos usam e abusam de três táticas que os tornam invulneráveis: a tática da tesoura ou pinça, a hudna e a taqiyya.

A primeira, atacar em duas frentes aparentemente opostas, é amplamente utilizada em grande parte explorando esta oposição dos Ocidentais em verem o Islam tal qual ele é, preferindo acreditar na existência de radicais e moderados, fornecendo subsídios até econômicos para os últimos acreditando que serão usados para promover a paz pacificando os radicais ou 'fundamentalistas'. Não quero dizer que não existam muçulmanos realmente pacíficos como Akbar Ahmed, professor da American University, citado por Cliff May ao comentar a controversa proposta de construir uma mesquita no Ground Zero: "os líderes muçulmanos devem entender que o 11 de setembro ainda é uma ferida aberta para os americanos. E é errado jogar sal numa ferida aberta". Não obstante existirem muçulmanos moderados isoladamente, não há nenhum movimento não-fundamentalista organizado, como os intelectuais de esquerda querem acreditar. Não há com quem negociar, o verdadeiro Islam, agressivo e expansionista, usa estes moderados para iludir os dhimmi de que contam com apoio entre eles.

Hudna é uma palavra árabe que significa trégua, somente um cessar fogo temporário para se rearmarem e reorganizarem, mas que consegue confundir a tal "comunidade internacional". Já elaborei mais profundamente no meu artigo Hudna - a suprema dissimulação.

Taqiyya é a racionalização religiosa para esconder ou disfarçar as verdadeiras crenças, convicções e estratégias num momento de perigo iminente - que pode ser no presente ou no futuro. Quer dizer: dissimulação pura e simples. Elaborarei melhor sobre ela na última parte da série já mencionada.

Pronunciamentos pacíficos de líderes palestinos

A Globo News e o site globo.com deram grande destaque ao pronunciamento de um rabino israelense que, durante a leitura de um trecho Bíblico sobre o ano novo judaico que fala sobre a queda dos ímpios, pede uma praga contra Mahmoud Abbas (o terrorista tambem conhecido como Abu Mazen) e os palestinos que odeiam os judeus e Israel, e classificou o pronunciamento como violento e radical.

Por que será que os seguintes pronunciamentos de líderes políticos, religiosos e da TV 'estatal' palestina - que não pedem pragas contra terroristas, mas que incitam claramente o assassinato indiscriminado de judeus e israelenses (ocasionalmente de americanos, cristãos e europeus) - nunca foram mostrados?

Muslim Zionism III - 'This Is My State. I'm An Israeli Patriot': An Interview with Druze MK Ayoub Kara

Non-Jews are no strangers to Israel's policy of inclusivity in its government. What is strange is finding a non-Jewish Knesset member who is more Zionistic than most of his fellow parliamentarians. Ayoub Kara, a Druze Likud Knesset minister, is proud to consider himself one of the most "right wing" members of the Knesset.

Kara, who was appointed deputy minister of the development of the Negev and Galilee by Prime Minister Netanyahu, was first elected to the Knesset in 1999. He was appointed Speaker of the Knesset, served as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Workers and later as chairman of the Anti-Drug Committee.

In a unique position to reach out to others, Kara spoke with the mufti of Turkey following the flotilla crisis in an effort to mend bridges. He defended Israel as "the most humanitarian country in the Middle East" and urged the mufti to preach brotherhood "because there are no winners in war, and the way of peace and dialogue is preferable to the miseries of war."

Kara lives in the Druze town of Daliyat al-Karmel near Haifa with his wife and five children

The Jewish Press: Can you explain the history and attitudes of the Druze people?

Kara: The Druze descend from Jethro, the father-in-law of Moses. Both Jethro and Moses are prophets of the Druze, and we share the same book of religion as the Jews. The Druze believe, through the prophet Jethro, that the land of Israel is for the Jews and should be defended for the Jews.

Around a hundred years ago, when the Jews wanted to make a state of their own, the Druze helped them. They defended Jewish kibbutzim and gave the Jews in the North guns. They even cooperated with the Druze in Syria to support the Jews. There are around two million Druze in Israel living in the North, in the Galilee, the Carmel, the Golan Heights, and we serve in the Israeli army. Unlike the Palestinians, we have no aspirations for our own state.

Do Druze in other countries share the same beliefs regarding Israel?

This is the philosophy of most Druze, but they're scared to speak out about it. The Druze are afraid of the Muslims. Privately they say they share a historical religion with the Jews, but out loud most of the Druze don't speak like that. There is no democracy and free speech in Arab countries and many of the Druze are pressured to convert to Islam. In Israel it's different because we have freedom to say we're Druze, and we even have a Druze flag next to the Israeli flag. We can't do this in Arab countries. I was in Lebanon and Syria, and I know how the Druze there feel. They feel like outsiders and are scared of the Muslims.

To what extent has your family been involved in Israel's struggle for survival?

Before 1948 my grandfather helped the Jews and paid a big price. His son, my uncle, was the first Druze to be killed by the Arabs in 1939. He was an officer on the side of Chaim Weizmann, the first president of Israel, and he was killed by Arabs in Acco [Acre] because they said that he supported the Jews. My father fought with Tzahal in 1948 in the Galilee. Another uncle of mine was killed by Arabs at that time. And my two brothers were killed in the Lebanon War in 1982 near Beirut.

I was also severely injured in the Lebanon War, and my parents died soon after from heartbreak. I returned to my village near Haifa and started my own family after that. I need peace. I don't like war, but I speak about my tragedy because it's important to hear how my family paid such a price to defend Israel. I believe the ultimate importance for me, more than anything, is that I live in a democratic state with human rights. In all the surrounding Arab countries there are no human rights, no courts, no justice.

You serve as deputy minister of the Galilee and Negev. What do you consider the most significant challenges you face in these areas?

The big problem in the Galilee and Negev is the migration of people from these areas to the center of Israel. They move there to study and work because we don't have companies and business in the north and south to provide work for the young people. And when they move to the center, that means the Arabs gain in these areas. President Peres keeps talking about demographics as the reason to give the Palestinians another state. In the future a new Peres could come and say we have to give the Arabs in the north and south another state. I am afraid of that because there will be more Arabs than Jews.

What efforts are you making to combat this problem?

I am trying to introduce new initiatives in the government. One is in the area of education. We now offer soldiers who finish the army the opportunity to study for free in the Galilee and Negev, and we're also building a big college for medicine in the Galilee. We are trying to build new big roads for people to commute more quickly from the center [of Israel]. We support companies who come to these areas and provide incentives for them. We allowed Intel to open a big factory in the Negev with many rights from the government. This is our opportunity to change the demographics. If we don't pursue this we will find ourselves with more Arabs than Jews in these areas. In 1948 there were 20,000 Beduin in the Negev. Now, with no immigration, there are 200,000 Beduin.

You spoke out very strongly against the Gaza Disengagement. Do you think the Israeli public has learned anything from the results of that withdrawal?

I think the Jewish people are very naïve. I was against the withdrawal from Lebanon and was alone in my opposition. I said that Hizbullah will be motivated from this. In 1982 most of the public in Lebanon were more liberal - Christian, Druze and secular Muslims - and we were mostly at peace with them. I told [then-prime minister Ehud] Barak that it was important for us to support this group. But we withdrew quickly, and Hizbullah gained power in this area as a result of the withdrawal.

The same thing happened when Sharon withdrew from Gaza. I led the opposition to this plan in the government, but when I spoke out I was accused of opposing peace and supporting war. I tried to stop the Disengagement through the finance committee in the Knesset, but I was told if I don't agree with them they will throw me out of the parliament. Now it's different. More than 90 percent now understand that what happened in Gush Katif and South Lebanon was a mistake. They know that if there are any withdrawals in Yehudah and Shomron, the same thing would happen and there would be an Iranian ascendancy in those areas.

But we have the Supreme Court and other liberals in Israel who think we are negotiating with people who have the same mentality as Jews, Europeans or Americans. But in the Middle East, the Arabs tell you what you want to hear and not what you have to hear. The Jews did not understand this until now.

I don't want Israel to make another mistake. This is my state. For me the religion is not important - Druze, Jewish, or Christian. I am an Israeli patriot.

Yet you serve as a deputy minister in a Likud coalition whose prime minister endorsed the two-state solution and is pressing for direct talks with the Palestinians. Do you see this as a contradiction? I support Netanyahu and am one of his close friends. I don't think Netanyahu would give up any land, but he's realistic and knows he would look bad to the world if he opposes Obama. Obama has an agenda to give a state to the Palestinians. But he doesn't live here. We do. When they pushed us on Gush Katif we gave them land, and when we were attacked afterward I didn't see the U.S. come to defend us.

It's very popular to say two states for two people, but when you speak about this you have to have a partner and leadership to give them a state. Who would lead this state? Abbas and Fayyad cannot cross the border of Hebron. If there would be an election in the West Bank, Hamas would of course win. And Abbas and Fayyad don't lead in Gaza. They are not relevant there. If they would cross the border into Gaza Hamas would kill them. That's why I laugh when they talk about two states.

In all history there was never a Palestinian state. I don't support the two-state solution. We have to look at the Palestinians' intentions. Most of the Palestinians don't believe Israel should exist. The state of the Palestinians is Jordan. More than 90 percent of Jordan is Palestinian. If they want us to go back to the 1967 borders, then Jordan should lead the Palestinian cities in Judea and Samaria civilly, not in defense, while Israel should [maintain its presence] in the big cities and all the areas in between. And Egypt should retake control of Gaza. We should end any relationship with Gaza. We don't have any other solution for Gaza. De facto we have another state there.

But what if Egypt doesn't want a relationship with Gaza?

So what? We are being pushed to give another state and we don't want that either. If they want us to move to the 1967 borders then they have too also. Egypt has problems with the Muslim Brotherhood, but we have our problems too. If the Egyptians kill a few thousand people in Gaza in broad daylight no one would say anything, but if Israel kills one Palestinian it makes news around the world. If we do not give Gaza to Egypt there's no other solution. The same thing with Jordan and the West Bank.

We need real peace in the Middle East, but I am not going to agree with Obama's plan. No Obama and no Osama can push us to enable Iran to come into Jerusalem.