terça-feira, 27 de dezembro de 2011

A verdade sobre os palestinos

Sob Obama, os últimos três anos de troca da verdade a respeito de Israel pelas mentiras palestinas tornaram a região menos estável, Israel mais vulnerável e os Estados Unidos menos respeitáveis.


Recentemente, o primeiro colocado entre os pré-candidatos do Partido Republicano à presidência dos EUA, Newt Gingrich, ex-presidente da Câmara, fez algo revolucionário. Ele falou a verdade sobre os palestinos. Em uma entrevista ao Jewish Channel, Gingrich disse que os palestinos são um povo “inventado”, “sendo, de fato, árabes”.

Sua afirmação sobre os palestinos foi totalmente precisa. No final de 1920, o “povo palestino” foi formado artificialmente de entre a população árabe da “Grande Síria”. A “Grande Síria” incluía a atual Síria, o Líbano, Israel, a Autoridade Palestina e a Jordânia. Isto é, o povo palestino foi inventado 91 anos atrás. Além disso, como observou Gingrich, o termo “povo palestino” somente se tornou amplamente aceito depois de 1977.

Como registrou Daniel Pipes, em 1989, num artigo sobre o assunto no Middle East Quarterly (Periódico Trimestral do Oriente Médio), os árabes locais, no que se tornou Israel, optaram por uma identidade local nacionalista “palestina”, em parte devido a seu sentimento de que seus irmãos na Síria não estavam suficientemente comprometidos com a erradicação do sionismo. (The Year the Arabs Discovered Palestine)

Desde que Gingrich se pronunciou, sua declaração factual precisa tem enfrentado ataques que partem de três direções. Primeiro, sua declaração tem sido atacada pelos apologistas palestinos no campo pós-modernista. Falando à CNN, Hussein Ibish, da Força Tarefa Americana Sobre a Palestina, afirmou que a declaração de Gingrich foi uma afronta porque, embora ele estivesse certo sobre os palestinos serem um povo artificial, na visão de Ibish, os israelenses são tão artificiais quanto os palestinos. Isto é, ele igualou o nacionalismo dos palestinos, de 91 anos, com o nacionalismo dos judeus, de 3.500 anos.

Em suas palavras: “Chamar os palestinos de “um povo inventado”, em um esforço óbvio para enfraquecer sua identidade nacional, é uma afronta, especialmente porque não existia algo como um “israelense” antes de 1948”.

O absurdo da afirmação de Ibish é facilmente descartado por meio de uma simples leitura da Bíblia hebraica. Como qualquer pessoa semialfabetizada em hebraico reconhece, os israelenses não foram criados em 1948. Três mil anos atrás, os israelenses foram liderados por um rei chamado Davi. Os israelenses tinham uma comunidade independente na Terra de Israel, e sua capital era Jerusalém.

O fato de que 500 anos atrás o rei Tiago renomeou os israelenses como “israelitas” (na Bíblia King James) é irrelevante para a verdade básica de que não há nada de novo nem de artificial a respeito do povo israelense. E o sionismo, o movimento de libertação nacional dos judeus, não surgiu em competição com o nacionalismo árabe. O sionismo tem sido uma característica central da identidade judaica por 3.500 anos.

A segunda linha de ataque contra Gingrich nega a veracidade de sua afirmação. Um dos luminares palestinos, Salam Fayyad, o primeiro-ministro da Autoridade Palestina, que não foi eleito, falou à CNN: “O povo palestino habitava aquelas terras desde o despertar da história”.

A afirmação de Fayyad, não substanciada historicamente, foi, a seguir, expandida pelo membro do Conselho Revolucionário do Fatah, Dmitri Diliani, em uma entrevista na CNN: “O povo palestino (é) descendente da tribo canaanita dos jebuseus, que habitavam o antigo sítio de Jerusalém em torno dos anos 3.200 AEC (Antes da Era Comum)”, enfatizou Diliani.

A Terra de Israel apresenta a maior densidade de sítios arqueológicos do mundo. Judéia, Samaria, Galiléia, Negev, as Colinas de Golan, e outras áreas do país estão repletas de evidências arqueológicas das comunidades judaicas. Quanto a Jerusalém, literalmente cada centímetro da cidade possui provas físicas das reivindicações históricas do povo judeu com relação à cidade.

Até hoje, não foi descoberta nenhuma evidência arqueológica, ou outra, que ligue os palestinos à cidade ou aos jebuseus.

A partir da perspectiva política doméstica dos Estados Unidos, uma terceira linha de ataque contra a declaração factual de Gingrich tem sido a mais significativa. Os ataques envolvem as pessoas bem informadas e conservadoras de Washington, muitas das quais são defensoras sinceras do principal rival de Gingrich para a nominação presidencial republicana, o ex-governador de Massachusetts Mitt Romney.

Até agora, a representante mais forte dos que estão atacando tem sido Jennifer Rubin, blogueira do jornal Washington Post. Essas pessoas bem informadas argumentam que, embora Gingrich tenha falado a verdade, essa foi uma irresponsabilidade e não está de acordo com o que se espera de um estadista.

Como disse Rubin: “Será que os conservadores realmente acham que é uma boa idéia que seu pré-candidato contrarie décadas da política americana e negue que existe uma identidade nacional palestina?”.

Segundo a visão deles, Gingrich é um incendiário irresponsável porque está voltando suas costas a 30 anos de consenso bipartidário. Esse consenso se baseia em ignorar o fato de que os palestinos são um povo artificial cuja identidade não surgiu de uma experiência histórica compartilhada, mas da oposição ao nacionalismo judaico.

O objetivo da política do consenso é estabelecer um Estado palestino independente a oeste do rio Jordão, que viverá em paz com Israel.

Essa política foi obsessivamente promovida durante os anos 1990, até que fracassou completamente no ano 2000, quando o líder palestino Yasser Arafat rejeitou a oferta do então primeiro-ministro de Israel, Ehud Barak, e do então presidente dos Estados Unidos, Bill Clinton, de estabelecer um Estado palestino, e deu início à guerra terrorista palestina contra Israel.

Mas, em vez de reconhecer que essa política - e a defesa da identidade nacional palestina em seu cerne - havia falhado, e de considerar outras opções, as lideranças políticas americanas em Washington apegaram-se a ela com unhas e dentes. Republicanos, como o mentor de Rubin, Elliot Abrams, ex-vice-Conselheiro de Segurança Nacional, prosseguiu apoiando entusiasticamente a entrega de Gaza por Israel em 2005, e insuflando a participação do Hamas nas eleições palestinas de 2006. Aquela retirada e aquelas eleições elevaram o grupo de terrorismo jihadista ao poder.

O consenso que Gingrich rejeitou ao falar a verdade sobre a natureza artificial do nacionalismo palestino se baseou na tentativa de conciliar o apoio popular a Israel com a propensão da elite por apaziguamento. Por um lado, devido ao tremendo apoio público em favor de uma aliança forte dos Estados Unidos com Israel, a maioria dos que decidem os rumos da política americana não ousou abandonar Israel como aliado dos EUA.

Por outro lado, os líderes políticos americanos têm se sentido historicamente desconfortáveis por terem que defender Israel diante de seus colegas europeus anti-Israel e diante de seus interlocutores árabes, que compartilham da rejeição dos palestinos ao direito de existência de Israel.

O esforço de buscar combinar uma política de apaziguamento árabe (anti-Israel) com uma política anti-apaziguamento (pró-Israel) foi defendida por sucessivos governos dos EUA, até que foi sumariamente descartada pelo presidente Barack Obama três anos atrás. Obama substituiu a política de duas cabeças por uma que busca puramente o apaziguamento árabe.

Obama foi capaz de justificar sua mudança porque a política de dois rumos fracassou. Não houve paz entre Israel e os palestinos. O preço do petróleo foi às alturas e os interesses dos EUA em toda a região estavam cada vez mais ameaçados.

Por seu lado, Israel estava muito mais vulnerável ao terror e à guerra do que havia estado há anos. E seu isolamento diplomático era agudo e estava aumentando.

Infelizmente, tanto para os EUA quanto para Israel, a quebra do consenso por parte de Obama desestabilizou a região, colocou Israel em perigo e arriscou os interesses dos EUA num grau muito maior do que haviam estado durante a política de dois trilhos de seus predecessores. Por todo o mundo árabe, as forças islâmicas estão em alta.

O Irã está às portas de se tornar uma potência nuclear.

Os Estados Unidos já não são vistos como uma potência regional confiável à medida que retiram suas forças do Iraque sem obtenção de vitória, paralisam suas forças no Afeganistão, sentenciando-o à pauperização e à derrota, e abandonam seus aliados em um país após outro.

O rigoroso contraste entre a rejeição de Obama ao consenso fracassado, por um lado, e a rejeição de Gingrich ao consenso fracassado, por outro lado, indica que Gingrich pode muito bem ser o contraste perfeito para Obama.

A disposição de Gingrich de afirmar e defender a verdade sobre a natureza do conflito palestino com Israel é a resposta perfeita para o discurso desastroso de Obama “ao mundo islâmico” no Cairo, em junho de 2009. Foi naquele discurso que Obama abandonou oficialmente o consenso bipartidário, abandonou Israel, a verdade sobre o sionismo e os diretos nacionais judeus, e abraçou completamente a mentira nacionalista palestina e seus direitos nacionais.

Tanto Rubin quanto Abrams, assim como Romney, justificaram seus ataques a Gingrich e sua defesa ao consenso fracassado ao observarem que nenhum líder israelense está dizendo o que Gingrich disse. Rubin foi tão longe a ponto de alegar que as palavras verdadeiras de Gingrich sobre os palestinos ofenderam Israel.

Isso, logicamente, é um absurdo. O que muitos americanos deixam de reconhecer é que os líderes israelenses não são tão livres para dizer a verdade sobre a natureza do conflito como são os americanos. Em vez de olharem para a liderança de Israel nessa questão, os líderes americanos fariam bem em ver Israel como o equivalente da Alemanha Ocidental durante a Guerra Fria. Com a metade de Berlim ocupada pelo Exército Vermelho e com Berlim Ocidental servindo como estopim para a invasão soviética à Europa Ocidental, os líderes da Alemanha Ocidental não eram tão livres para falar a verdade sobre a União Soviética como os americanos.

Atualmente, com Jerusalém sob constante ameaça política e terrorista, com todo o Israel cada vez mais rodeado por regimes islâmicos, e com o governo Obama abandonando o apoio tradicional dos Estados Unidos a Israel, está se tornando cada vez menos razoável esperar que Israel tome a liderança retórica para falar verdades importantes e difíceis sobre a natureza de seus vizinhos.

Quando Romney criticou a declaração de Gingrich como sendo pouco útil a Israel, Gingrich replicou: “Sinto-me bastante confiante de que um número espantoso de israelenses achou bom que um americano dissesse a verdade sobre a guerra no meio da qual eles estão, sobre as perdas que estão tendo, e sobre o povo ao seu redor, que diz: "Eles não têm o direito de existir e nós queremos destruí-los”'.

Ele está absolutamente certo. Foi mais do que amável. Foi encorajador.

Trinta anos de mentiras americanas pré-Obama sobre a natureza do conflito em uma tentativa de equilibrar o apoio a Israel com o apaziguamento dos árabes não tornaram os Estados Unidos mais seguros, nem o Oriente Médio mais pacífico. Um retorno àquela política sob um novo presidente republicano não será suficiente para restaurar a estabilidade e a segurança da região.

E a necessidade de tal restauração é aguda. Sob Obama, os últimos três anos de troca da verdade a respeito de Israel pelas mentiras palestinas tornaram a região menos estável, Israel mais vulnerável, os Estados Unidos menos respeitáveis, e os interesses americanos mais ameaçados.

A declaração de Gingrich sobre a verdade não foi um ato de um incendiário irresponsável. Foi o início de um antídoto para o abandono da verdade por Obama e para as argumentações em favor de mentiras e apaziguamento. E, como tal, não foi um motivo para irritação. Foi um motivo para esperança.

segunda-feira, 26 de dezembro de 2011

Saudi school textbooks show the right way to chop off hands and feet

Twelfth-grade Saudi textbook: The Struggle with the Jews is religious, not political


Just look what 9th and 10th graders are being taught in the Islamic kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The books were published and handed out to 9th and 10th-graders despite Saudi Arabia's promises to clean up textbooks in the kingdom.

Ali Al-Ahmed, director of the Institute for Gulf Affairs, told Fox News: 'This is where terrorism starts, in the education system.

'They show students how to cut (the) hand and the feet of a thief,' he said.

The textbooks were printed for the 2010-2011 academic year and translated from Arabic by the institute.

In one, for ninth-graders, students are taught the annihilation of the Jewish people is imperative.

One text reads in part: 'The hour (of judgment) will not come until the Muslims fight the Jews and kill them. There is a Jew behind me come and kill him.'

According to the translations, women are described as weak and irresponsible.

Mr Al-Ahmed said the textbooks also call for homosexuals to be put to death 'because they pose a danger at society, as the Saudi school books teaches'.

Mr Al-Ahmed said: 'If you teach six million children in these important years of their lives, if you install that in their brain, no wonder we have so many Saudi suicide bombers.'

domingo, 25 de dezembro de 2011

منطق غريب في الحرب اللبنانية

بقلم دانيال بايبس
المصنف الإنجليزي الأصلي: Strange Logic in the Lebanon War


مع قيام العاملين ببعض مؤسسات النشر والإذاعة والتليفزيون ووكالات الأنباء المرموقة بالتحيز إلى جانب حزب الله في حربه ضد إسرائيل، فإنهم قاموا دون قصد بالكشف عن تحولات هامة وخطيرة في منطق الحرب والعمليات الحربية.
فيما يلي بعض الأمثلة لأفعالهم:
  • رويترز: قام عدنان حاج، مصور فوتوجرافي مستقل له خبرة تزيد عن عشرة سنوات في التعاون مع رويترز، بعمل تغييرات غير أمينة في صوره حتى تبدو الهجمات الإسرائيلية على لبنان أكثر إحداثاً للدمار وحتى يبدو اللبنانيون أكثر عرضة للأذى المادي والمعنوي*. اشتملت تحريفاته على إضافة دخان مرتفع للسماء أكثر سمكا وأكثر سواداً للدخان الطبيعي المتصاعد من جراء غارات القصف الجوي، وعلى تصوير نفس المرأة تصرخ باكية فقدان مسكنها الذي دمرته القذائف في ثلاثة مواقع أو أماكن مختلفة. قامت رويترز بإنهاء تعاقدها مع السيد حاج وبإزالة 920 صورة فوتوجرافية قام بالتقاطها من سجلاتها (أرشيفها) إزالة رسمية. وكشف المزيد من البحث من قبل بعض البلوجيرز (القائمين على مواقع شبكة المعلومات الإليكترونية) عن أربعة أنواع من الصور المزيفة بواسطة رويترز، وكلها تُبالغ في تصوير الأعمال العدائية الإسرائيلية. بل قام البلوجيرز بتوثيق الكيفية التي تم بها تزييف صور رويترز من أجل التأثير في المُشاهد .


  • البي بي سي: كان المحررون يسعون لاصطياد تقارير وروايات شخصية من أجل تصوير إسرائيل في صورة شريرة، وقاموا بعرض هذا الطلب والإعلان على صفحات أخبارها: "هل تعيش في غزة؟ هل تأثرت بالعنف في المنطقة؟ ارسل لنا تجربتك وخبرتك باستخدام النموذج أدناه. إذا كان يُسعدك الحديث معنا فضلاً سجل كيفية الاتصال بك."
  • سي ان ان: لمَّحت روزماري تشُرش، العاملة بالبرنامج أو القسم الدولي، إلى أن القوات الإسرائيلية كانت قادرة على إسقاط صواريخ حزب الله إلا أنها اختارت ألا تفعل، وذلك عندما سألت متحدثاً رسميا إسرائيلياً، "هل يُمكن القول أن إسرائيل لم تحاول إسقاطها من السماء؟ إنهم يملكون القدرة على فعل ذلك."
  • الواشنطن بوست: وبالمثل صرح توماس ريكس، مراسل الشؤون العسكرية، على شاشة تليفزيون وطني أن عدداً من المحللين العسكريين الأمريكيين لم يرغبوا في الإعلان عن أسمائهم عتقدون أن الحكومة الإسرائيلية "تركت عن عمد جيوباً لصواريخ حزب الله في لبنان، لأنه طالما يقوم حزب الله بإطلاق صواريخه على الإسرائيليين فسوف يظل لدى الإسرائيليين نوعً من التكافؤ الأخلاقي والمعنوي يغطي عملياتهم في لبنان." وهو يفسر ذلك بأنه عندما يجد المرء شعبه في حالة خطر ويتعرض للأذى فإن ذلك يمنحه "موقفاً متميزاً من الناحية المعنوية والأخلاقية."
تنشأ كل هذه الأفعال في العمل الصحفي والإعلامي عن تصور مضمونه أن الطرف الذي تسقط منه قتلى وجرحى والذي يبدو في صورة الضحية إنما يَقوى موقفه في الحرب. على سبيل المثل، كان الهدف من صور حاج المزيفة هو تشويه صورة إسرائيل، مما يحرك الشقاق الداخلي، ويُضعف الموقف الدولي لإسرائيل، ويخلق ضغطاً على الحكومة من أجل وقف هجماتها على لبنان.
إلا أن هذه الظاهرة التي نرى فيها كل طرف يستعرض آلامه وخسارته إنما تقلب وتعكس ما كان في الماضي، حيث كان كل طرف يود أن يُرهب ويُخيف العدو بالظهور في صورة القوي والقاسي الذي لا يلين ولا يتنازل عن النصر. في الحرب العالمية الثانية مثلاً قام مكتب المعلومات الحربية للولايات المتحدة بتحريم طباعة أو نشر أفلام أو صور فوتوجرافية تعرض قتلى من الجنود الأمريكيين طوال العامين الأول والثاني من الحرب ثم لان موقف المكتب بعض الشيء فيما بعد. في نفس الوقت، قام مكتب الصور المتحركة (الأفلام) بإنتاج أفلام مثل "أعداؤنا ــ اليابانيون،" يعرض صور الموتى من اليابانيين ومشاهد الفقر والبؤس والمهانة اليابانية.
كانت القاعدة طوال الآلاف من السنين هي إظهاربأس وشجاعة وتفوق الذات وتشويه شجاعة وبراعة العدو، تشهد على ذلك الرسومات الجدارية المصرية، والمزهريات الإغريقية، والشعر العربي، والرسوم الصينية، والأغاني الشعبية الإنجليزية، والمسرح الروسي. لماذا قام المقاتلون (وحلفاؤهم في حقل الصحافة والإعلام) بقلب وعكس هذا النمط وهذه القاعدة العالمية والقديمة، بالتقليل من بأسهم وإبراز بأس وتفوق العدو؟
السبب هو القوة غير المسبوقة التي تتمتع بها أمريكا وحلفاؤها. فسر عالم التاريخ بول كيندي هذا الأمر في عام 2002 بقوله "من الناحية العسكرية لا يوجد سوى لاعب واحد هام فقط في الملعب يؤخذ في الاعتبار." ويري أن دراسة التاريخ توضح أنه "لم يسبق أن كان هناك مثل هذا التباين في القوة." وإسرائيل، بوصفها قوة إقليمية بذاتها وبوصفها حليفة وثيقة لواشنطن، تتمتع بتفوق مماثل بالمقارنة مع حزب الله.
مثل هذا التباين في القوة يوحي بأنه عندما يحارب الغرب طرفاً غير غربي فإن النتيجة على أرض المعركة مضمونة. ولأن النتيجة محسومة سلفاً، يبدو القتال وكأنه في المقام الأول حملات أو عمليات للشرطة أكثر منه قتالاً عسكريا في الصورة التقليدية. وكما هو الحال في حملات الشرطة، يكون الحكم على الحروب الحديثة المعاصرة بناءً على شرعيتها، وطول مدة العمليات العدائية، وتكافؤ القوة، وفداحة عدد القتلى والجرحى، ودرجة الدمار الاقتصادي والبيئي.
تلك هي القضايا التي يدور حولها الجدل، وهو جدل يصل في قوته إلى درجة انتقال مركز الجاذبية كما جاء في كتابات كلاوزيفيتس من أرض المعركة إلى ما يُكتب في الصفحة الرئيسية المقابلة لصفحة محرر الجريدة وإلى الشخصيات التليفزيونية.**
يشير هذا الواقع الجديد إلى حاجة الحكومات الغربية، سواء أمريكا في العراق أو إسرائيل في لبنان، إلى رؤية العلاقات العامة بوصفها جزء من استراتيجيتها. لقد تكيف وتواءم حزب الله مع هذه الحقيقة الجديدة للحياة، إلا أن تلك الحكومات لم تقم بذلك حتى الآن.
* السيد حاج ضيف دائم على قناة الجزيرة القطرية ــ المترجم.
** كارل فون كلاوزيفيتس هو جنرال ومنظر عسكري بروسي، دعا إلى الحرب الشاملة أو الكلية ــ المترجم.
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تحديث بتاريخ 15 أغسطس 2006: في مُلصق بلا تاريخ على شبكة المعلومات الإليكترونية، يعرض أليكس سافيان من كاميرا ما تجده في:
sort-of retraction by Thomas Ricks
ويترجم كالتالي: توماس ريكس يتراجع نوعاً ما. وهو تعليق، يتناول كلامه الذي استشهدت به في مقالتي، أرسله إلى المسؤول عن التحقيق في الشكاوى وتسويتها بالواشنطن بوست:
اج ( صوت هو علامة على الانزعاج ـ المترجم). ليتني ما تكلمت. سوف أرفق نسخة طبق الأصل في الختام. ما قلته كان دقيقاً: في محادثة ليست للنشر أو الإذاعة مع عدد من المحللين العسكريين، ذهب إثنان منهم إلى القول بأن الاستراتيجية الإسرائيلية تضمنت ترك جيوب لصواريخ حزب الله على حالها دون تدمير من أجل صياغة وتشكيل مايراه الرأي العام ومن أجل إعطاء قواتهم المزيد من حرية المناورة في لبنان. مثل تلك الاستراتيجية يُمكن اعتبارها منطقية ومعقولة بل حتى أخلاقية، بمعنى أن معاناة سقوط قتلى وجرحى على المدى القصير قد يعود بالمزيد من الحماية لعدد أكبر من الإسرائيليين على المدى البعيد.
إلا أنني منذ ذلك الوقت سمعت من بعض الاشخاص الأذكياء والمُطلعين على الأمور بصورة حسنة أنه بينما قد تكون هذه الاستراتيجية منطقية إلا أن الشعب الإسرائيلي لم يتحملها. وأنهم شعروا بالإحباط والحزن والغضب الشديد من جراء إذاعة هذا الأمر.
لقد اعتمدت في كلامي وتعليقاتي على محادثة طويلة مع مسؤول إسرائيلي رفيع المستوى دارت بيننا منذ عامين ...
مع خالص تمنياتي
توم
يرى سافيان تناقضاً وعدم ثبات في الرسالة أو التعليق مما يعني أن هناك "مشكلة خطيرة" بها:
بناءً على مصادر موثوق بها لدى سي ان ان وصف السيد ريكس مصدره على أنه "عدد من المحللين العسكريين بالولايات المتحدة،" بينما في رسالته أو تعليقه يصف مصدره بأنه "مسؤول إسرائيلي رفيع المستوى." مما يُثير التساؤل هل اعتمد السيد ريكس على أي مصدر ــ خلاف السيد ريكس نفسه.

Staged Photographs


External Links

More Reuters Photo Fraud Uncovered The American Thinker, 08/10/07

terça-feira, 20 de dezembro de 2011

O chocante amor árabe por Hitler

Pesquisar por “Hitler” em árabe foi uma jornada a um túnel de escuridão deprimente.


A extensão do amor ou ódio do público a personagens históricos talvez possa ser determinado digitando o nome desse personagem na ferramenta de busca do Google. Hoje em dia, digitar o nome de ditadores árabes em caracteres árabes mostra uma insatisfação geral que os iguala a tiranos como Hitler. Mas e se você digitasse o nome do próprio “Hitler” em caracteres árabes no Google? O que vai encontrar? “Hitler” em árabe tem tantos resultados quanto o número de judeus que ele assassinou: mais de 6 milhões. Embora seja impossível ler 6 milhões de blogs e sites para apurar o que o mundo árabe pensa sobre ele, ler atentamente algumas centenas deles pode deixar os ocidentais chocados ao perceberem que a maioria dos comentários, de uma maneira ou de outra, elogiam ou glorificam Hitler.

O primeiro site árabe possui um blog que o apresenta da seguinte forma: “Hitler não era um homem comum para ser esmagado pela roda do tempo e deixado para trás como poeira, para ser esquecido neste vasto universo. Tampouco era o rei apenas da Alemanha. Ele é um dos grandes entre poucos. É o rei da história”. Os ocidentais poderiam pensar que o primeiro comentário em um artigo como esse seria de repúdio. Nada disso. Muhammad Jasem postou: “Se os maiores líderes se juntassem, não se igualariam em magnificência a Hitler”. O restante dos comentários não focou longe disso. O segundo resultado foi um vídeo do Youtube intitulado “Os Judeus São Covardes”, mostrando um imitador de Hitler andando pelas ruas, com transeuntes judeus, supostamente apavorados, desviando-se dele. Isso “prova que judeus são covardes”, interpretavam os comentários.

A citação mais popular de Hitler em sites árabes é uma em que ele supostamente diz: “Eu poderia ter destruído todos os judeus, mas deixei alguns para que o mundo saiba um dia por que eu os matei”. O resultado seguinte é um vídeo do Youtube intitulado “A Declaração de Hitler sobre a Aniquilação dos Judeus”; o primeiro comentário dizia como Hitler “respeitava o Islã” e como ele chegou a convocar uma unidade muçulmana da SS e lhes conceder as pausas para orações.

Lendo com atenção, centenas de sites árabes mostram conteúdos similares.

Alegrei-me ao ver o que pensei ser o primeiro comentário positivo, à maneira ocidental, entre milhares, que dizia: “Hitler era um psicopata. Ele também teria matado todos os muçulmanos” mas logo me decepcionei com “mas, para ser sincero, eu adoro o Hitler por sua capacidade de liderança”. É claro, isso foi rapidamente repreendido por outros: “Se Hitler odiasse os árabes, por que ele iria convocar soldados muçulmanos para os seus postos? Isso deve ser propaganda sionista”.

Acusações de “propaganda sionista” e teorias da conspiração empesteiam a internet em língua árabe; a história factual é descreditada como “conspiração sionista”. Concluí das minhas próprias experiências antissemitas da minha infância que uma cultura empesteada de teorias da conspiração geralmente é a mesma que as produz.

Um comentário bastante típico afirmava: “Hitler deixou a outra metade [dos judeus] viva para que a profecia de Maomé seja cumprida e abra o caminho para o Islã destruir o restante”. No site Alsaha.com, principal fonte de notícias do Golfo Árabe, uma notícia sobre um filme recém-lançado em Paris retrata pela primeira vez como a Mesquita de Paris salvou guerrilheiros da resistência judaica e muçulmana durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial. Os comentários mais comuns vão de negadores do holocausto, longos posts de como o Grande Mufti Haj Amin Al-Husseini, líder palestino que fez aliança com Hitler, era um grande herói e como Hitler havia supostamente citado o Corão: “a Hora está próxima, e a lua foi feita em pedaços”. A citação do Corão supostamente dita por Hitler era tão comum que Ayed Al-Qarni, um dos mais respeitados teólogos sauditas, observou que Hitler havia gravado essa frase nos canhões e tanques das tropas da SS.

De acadêmicos muçulmanos a referências históricas, Hitler é um herói.

Objeções ao amor de Hitler existem, mas raramente são isentas de contradições nos mesmos termos. Um comentário criticava tal amor: “Hitler era um nazista que acreditava na raça ariana… É óbvio que Hitler elogiava o Islã porque estava aliado aos otomanos. Mas por que nós árabes temos que insistir nesse amor por Hitler? Só porque ele fez uma limpeza dos judeus? Maomé, e Omar depois dele, limparam Jerusalém deles muito antes de Hitler”. Se os ocidentais equiparassem Maomé a Hitler, a reação seria imensa. Mas não é incomum encontrar sites árabes afirmando que Hitler era um modelo que seguiu os passos de Maomé. “O único personagem na história que foi capaz de ganhar os judeus para mutilá-los foi Maomé”, Hitler foi citado dizendo. E é claro, consideraram um elogio.

Os comentários árabes não deixam de usar Hitler como exemplo para comparar tiranos árabes e para combater o extremismo. O site de notícias do Oriente Médio Walfajr.net publicou um artigo escrito por Al-Baqer Ali Al-Shamasi intitulado “Os Tambores Sionistas Tocam para a Guerra”. Ele escreve: “Hitler, esse nacionalista extremista, e seu amigo Mussolini, vieram e desencadearam uma guerra mundial que vitimou 60 milhões de pessoas”. Até aí tudo bem. Até que algumas linhas depois: “Quando Hitler fez o que fez com eles [os judeus], os sionistas usaram táticas para inventar o Holocausto”. Aceitar o Holocausto como uma realidade e negá-lo na mesma argumentação não é incomum nos sites árabes. Isso é sinal de um mentiroso patológico.

Pesquisar por “Hitler” em árabe foi uma jornada a um túnel de escuridão deprimente. “Hitler, o artista”, dizia um artigo. Hitler até mesmo “descobriu os desenhos de Walt Disney”, afirmava um comentário. Foi “Hitler quem desenhou pela primeira vez a ‘Branca de Neve e os Sete Anões’”. Do primeiro ao último comentário, o artigo foi um deleite.

O último comentário dizia que “Hitler odiava os judeus porque o médico de sua mãe, que era judeu, não cuidou dela e a deixou morrer. Foi um judeu que comprou as primeiras peças de arte de Hitler e lhe pagou pouco por elas, para depois revendê-las muito mais caro. Hitler mais tarde descobriu o roubo da sua arte pelos judeus. Essa foi a história que despertou a família de Hitler para quão trapaceiros são os judeus”.

Tudo isso me faz lembrar dos meus primeiros dias de escola na cidade de Belém, quando estudávamos os escritos do mais respeitado e eminente escritor egípcio, Anis Mansour, que uma vez escreveu: “Pessoas de todo o mundo vieram a se dar conta de que Hitler estava certo, pois os judeus são sanguessugas… interessados em destruir o mundo inteiro, que os enxotou e desprezou por séculos… e os queimou nos crematórios de Hitler… 1 milhão… 6 milhões. Se apenas ele tivesse terminado o serviço!”

Anis Mansour não passava de um marginal. Eu sei que isso pode irritar centenas de milhões de pessoas no mundo árabe que o respeitam. Talvez digam que eu fui infectado por uma conspiração americana. De fato, eu fui: chama-se “pensamento crítico”.

Tradução: Luis Gustavo Gentil

Título original: The shocking Arab love for Hitler

segunda-feira, 19 de dezembro de 2011

Twelfth-grade Saudi textbook: The Struggle with the Jews Is Not Political but Religious

Saudi Textbook: The Enmity between the Muslims and the Jews Is Everlasting


A twelfth-grade Saudi textbook titled Studies from the Muslim World includes a chapter on Palestine and the Palestinian cause, which deals extensively with the Jews. The chapter presents the conflict over Palestine as a religious struggle between the Jews and the Muslims that goes back to the era of the Prophet Muhammad. It states that there is no hope of ever making peace with the Jews because they do not believe in peace, but only strive to spread corruption and instability throughout the world, for they are liars, connivers and cheats by nature. It also stresses that these negative traits of the Jews are described in the Koran, and quotes verses to prove this. Finally, the chapter states that the only way to liberate Palestine is through jihad.

The following are excerpts:

The book's title page




The Struggle with the Jews Is Not Political but Religious

Page 91 reads: "Whoever studies the nature of the conflict between the Muslims and the Jews understands an important fact, [namely that] this is a religious conflict, not a dispute about politics or nationality, or a conflict between races or tribes, or a fight over land or country, as some describe it. This is a deeply rooted enmity, a conflict between truth and falsehood, between monotheism and polytheism, between heresy and faith. The enmity between us and the Jews will not cease under any circumstances until one of two things [happens]: either they join our religion and become Muslims, or we abandon our religion, God forbid. [Allah], may He be exalted, said [in the Koran]: 'They [the Jews] will not cease fighting with you until they turn you back from your religion, if they can' [Koran 2:217]; 'And the Jews will not be pleased with you, nor the Christians, until you follow their religion' [Koran 2:120].

"They are jealous of the fact that the Seal of the Prophets [i.e., Muhammad] came from among the Arabs and not from among the Children of Israel, and [because] they know well that our master, Muhammad, Allah's prayer be upon him, was the Prophet of Allah... [As it says in the Koran:] 'Those whom We have given the Book recognize him as they recognize their sons, and a party of them most surely conceal the truth while they know (it)' [Koran 2:146]. Once we realize the essence of this conflict, and that this enmity cannot cease, we understand how much those who say the conflict can be settled are misleading [us].

"Our conflict with the Jews clearly began following the hijra of our master, Muhammad, Allah's prayer be upon him, to Medina. It was then that the plots and schemes against the first Muslims began. [These Muslims waged] prolonged jihad against [the Jews], who were expelled from Medina in stages. The Banu Qaynuqa' [tribe] was the first to be expelled, following the incident of the Muslim woman.[1] Afterward, the members of the Banu Al-Nadir tribe were expelled, having tried to assassinate the Prophet, Allah's prayer be upon him, and then, the Banu Qurayza [tribe], who breached their covenant with the Muslims and joined the camps [of Muhammad's Meccan enemies] in the Battle of the Trench [in 627 CE]."

The Jews Spread Corruption, Fitna, and Conspiracies

Pages 91-92 read: "Throughout Islamic history, the Jews have striven to destroy the [Islamic] religion and spread fitna among the Muslims. All know about the fitna caused by the Jew 'Abdallah bin Saba during the time of 'Othman bin 'Affan, may Allah be pleased with him."[2]

"In modern times, Jewish influence has cut deeply into several Western countries, and [the Jews] have taken control of their economies and media. These countries were exploited for the Jews' benefit, and the two sides [i.e., the Jews and the West joined forces and] combined their interests in order to wipe out Islam. After Sultan 'Abd Al-Hamid, Allah's mercy be upon him, stood up to the Jews and rejected their tempting offers in exchange for Palestine, the Crusaders and Jews decided to destroy the Ottoman Islamic Caliphate so that Palestine would be handed to the Jews, and so that the imperialist countries could divide the Islamic world among themselves.

"[After] the Jews strayed from the correct religion brought [to them] by Moussa [Moses], peace be upon him, they did not take root in any land, nor did they legally own any land. They wandered in [various] regions, for wandering from place to place and being divided is in their nature. The Jews lived as oppressed minorities throughout the world, and caused corruption in every land they entered. In every country where they settled, they were a source of trouble and fitna. They build up their confidence by frightening others, which is why the peoples hated them and why they came to be known for their deceit and cunning."

Page 106 reads: "Zionism does not aspire to win over the friendship of others, for it does not want them to join it. Therefore, the Jews' relations with the nations among which they live have been characterized by tension and instability, which caused the peoples to support one another against [the Jews], to molest them, to deal them bitter blows, and to expel them. Since the Jews have been in the Diaspora, they have not known peace with any nation because they have [always] striven to [perpetrate] fraud, deceit, and cunning. There is no better proof of this than the Muslims' experience with them in Medina – [which caused] the Prophet to expel them and order to banish them from the Arabian Peninsula – and what happened to them in countries such as Germany, Poland, Spain, and elsewhere.

"Throughout their history, the Jews have never attributed any importance to peace... believing it impossible to establish peace with other nations. They even believe that the nations around them must live in perpetual strife that will undermine their stability, so that they will be unable to fight [the Jews]. This may explain the Jews' aspirations to spread destruction and corruption by various means, even in countries with which they claim to have what they call 'peace agreements.'"

The Jews' Corruption Is Described in the Koran

The textbook informs the pupils that the Jews' characteristics and traits are described in the Koran, and goes on to list and explain them. Pages 92-94 read: "The noble Koran is the best source to acquaint us with the [Jews'] personality and psychological makeup. The expressions 'Jews' and 'Children of Israel' appear more than 63 times in the book of Allah, may He be exalted. They were the nation charged with ruling the earth, but Allah took their [role of] leadership away from them due to their corruption and destructiveness, and because they killed the prophets. The following are a few brief descriptions of some of their traits, as they appear in the noble Koran:

"1. Attacking the very essence of Allah, may He be exalted: No one will be spared their mischief, even the very essence of Allah [himself], may He be exalted. [Allah], the mighty and exalted, said: 'And the Jews say: The hand of Allah is tied up! Their hands shall be shackled and they shall be cursed for what they say' [Koran 5:64]... 'Allah has certainly heard the saying of those who said: Surely Allah is poor and we are rich [Koran 3:181].

"2. [Spreading] corruption in the land: They are the people of corruption and destruction. They cast doubt on da'wa [calling to Islam], and spread rumors regarding the wives of the Prophet, Allah's prayer be upon him, and spread evil among the Muslims. [Allah,] may He be exalted, said: 'Their effort is for corruption in the land, and Allah does not love the corrupters' [Koran 5:64].

"3. Killing prophets: [Allah,] may He be exalted, said: 'They went on rejecting the signs of Allah and slaying His prophets without just cause. This is because they rebelled and went on transgressing' [Koran 2:61].

"4. Lying, spreading rumors and distorting [truths]: They are the people of lies, which are [all] they listen to, and they are the masters of falsifying and distorting the truth. Not even the prophecy of Allah escapes their distortion, and their Torah proves it. [Allah], may He be exalted, said: 'The Jews (are) men who will listen to any lie and listen even to others who have never so much as come to you. They change the words from their (right) times and places' [Koran 5:41].

"5. Deception and misleading: [Allah,] may He be exalted, said of them: 'They say: There is no call on us (to keep faith) with these ignorant (pagans)' [Koran 3:75].

"6. Rushing to [commit] sin: [Allah,] may He be exalted, said: 'And you will see many of them racing one another to [commit] sin and exceed the limits' [Koran 5:62].

"7. Inciting to wars and fitna: [Allah,] may He be exalted, said: 'Whenever they kindle a fire for war, Allah puts it out' [Koran 5:64].

"8. Breaching covenants and agreements: They are the nation best known for this characteristic. [Allah,] may He be exalted, said: 'Because of their breach of their covenant, We cursed them' [Koran 5:13]. They breached their covenants with the prophets, [including] the Prophet Muhammad, Allah's prayer be upon him, more than once, most famously when they breached their covenant with the Muslims and joined the polytheists on the day the [latter's forces] invaded [Medina]." (According to Muslim tradition, the members of the Kuraish tribe, who were enemies of the Prophet Muhammad in Mecca, convinced the Jews to cooperate with them and to attack on Muhammad in the battle of Al-Khandaq in 627 AD).

"9. Racist tendencies and scorn for the other: They think they are God's Chosen People. [Allah,] may He be exalted, said: 'And the Jews and the Christians say: We are the sons of Allah and His beloved ones' [Koran 5:18].

"10. Lust for life – any sort of life, even if it is despicable. [Allah,] may He be exalted, said: 'And you will most certainly find them the greediest of men for life' [Koran 2:96].

"11. Love of forbidden money: They hoard money by any means [possible]. [Allah,] may He be exalted, said of them: '(They are fond of) listening to falsehood, of devouring anything forbidden' [Koran 5:42].

"12. Cheating: This is manifest in the story of their fishing for a big fish on the Sabbath, when they are forbidden to work. They cheated when they set the net before the Sabbath with the intent of bringing it in after [the Sabbath]. [Allah,] may He be exalted, said: 'And ask them about the town which stood by the sea; when they exceeded the limits of the Sabbath, when their fish came to them on the day of their Sabbath, appearing on the surface of the water, and on the day on which they did not keep the Sabbath, they did not come to them; thus did We try them because they transgressed' [Koran 7:163].

"13. Argumentativeness: The loathsome manner of their argumentativeness is manifest in the story of the cow and their violation and trickery in the matter of [the cow's] ritual slaughter. [Allah,] may He be exalted, said: 'And when Moussa said to his people: Surely Allah commands you that you should sacrifice a cow; they said: Do you ridicule us? He said: I seek the protection of Allah from being one of the ignorant. They said: Call on your Lord...' [Koran 67-68. See also verses 69-71].

"14. Their great hatred for the Muslims: [Allah,] may He be exalted, said: 'Certainly you will find the most violent of people in enmity for those who believe (to be) the Jews' [Koran 5:82].

"15. Cowardice: In their hearts there is fear and anxiety, especially of the Muslims. [Allah,] may He be exalted, said: 'They will not fight against you in a body save in fortified towns or from behind walls' [Koran 59:14].

"16. Envy: [Allah,] may He be exalted, said of them: 'Many of the followers of the Book wish that they could turn you back into unbelievers after your faith, out of envy from themselves' [Koran 2:109].

"17. Obstinacy: Regarding this, Allah, may He be exalted, said: 'They said: We hear, and we disobey' [Koran 2:93]." (This is based on the biblical verse "We hear and obey").

The Jews Will Be Forced Out of Palestine through Jihad

Among the reasons given for the Arabs' defeats in their wars with the Jews are the following, which appear on page 105: "[One reason is] Islam's estrangement from the domain of [religious] struggle with the Jews, and the appearance of false calls and slogans such as Arab nationalism and socialism. [Another reason is that] many in the ummah disregard the [true] essence of our conflict with the Jews, which is a purely religious struggle, with the Jews drawing their principles from their distorted books. Allah, may He be exalted and glorified, commanded us to pin our hopes on Him. [Allah,] may He be exalted, said: 'And hold fast by the covenant of Allah all together and be not disunited' [Koran 3:103].

On page 112, the book enumerates a Muslim's obligations, including the following: "To overcome the spiritual defeatism that has harmed many of us. We are, as described by God, may He be praised and glorified, the greatest nation to have risen among mankind, and the Jews, as they are described by the noble Koran, are the most cowardly and life-lusting people, as has already been proven by the conflicts with the Jews throughout history.

"Jihad for the sake of Allah is the only path to liberating Palestine. Only through jihad did the Muslims conquer Jerusalem, and only through jihad did the Crusaders leave Palestine. Likewise, only through jihad will the Jews leave Palestine.

"The only point of departure in our handling of the issue of Palestine [should be] absolute faith in Islam and in the fact that all rulings related to this issue must be derived from [Islam]."
Endnotes:

[1] According to Muslim tradition, the conflict between the Muslims of Medina and the Jewish tribe of Banu Qaynuqa' began after a Muslim woman visited the shop of a Jewish jeweler in the market, who demanded that she take off her veil. When she refused, he fastened her cloak with a pin in such a way that, when she got up, she was stripped naked. A Muslim killed the jeweler in retaliation, starting a chain of revenge killings between the sides.

[2] According to some accounts, 'Abdallah bin Saba was a Jewish convert to Islam who became a disciple of the fourth Caliph, 'Ali bin Abu Talib, whom he considered to be divine, and therefore incited against the third Caliph, 'Othman bin 'Affan, bringing about his murder.

quinta-feira, 15 de dezembro de 2011

Normas de reportagem para o Oriente Médio

Da próxima vez que acompanhar o noticiário sobre Israel, assegure-se de saber ler nas entrelinhas.


Todos os meios de comunicação têm seu manual de estilo, elaborado de maneira tão clara e imparcial quanto possível. Hoje em dia, contudo, parece que o Ministério de Comunicação Palestino é quem publica e distribui seu manual a dezenas de jornais e outros veículos de comunicação.
Desde setembro de 2000, surgiu um novo “manual de estilo” de fato para os repórteres que cobrem a violência palestina contra Israel. Em alguns casos, as novas “normas de reportagem” são definidas pela própria linha editorial dos órgãos de informação.

Apesar do aspecto evidente de “jornalismo de encomenda”, é pouco provável que mãos conspiratórias estejam por trás de um desses manuais de estilo de fato. Na maioria das vezes, repórteres e correspondentes os adotam de modo informal, talvez até, de certa forma, sem plena consciência do que estão fazendo.

Invariavelmente, as novas regras são tendenciosas contra Israel.
Até agora, a tendenciosidade parece ter causado um impacto pequeno na opinião pública americana sobre Israel. Já na Europa, onde o tom antiisraelense é mais forte, mais estridente, o efeito é outro.
Seguem-se oito “normas” de reportagem sobre o Oriente Médio, extraídas de centenas de artigos e noticiários:


Regra nº 1 – Sensacionalize a intensidade e o alcance das ações militares israelenses.

Chame-as de “agressivas”, “devastadoras” ou “intensas”. Refira-se às incursões aos territórios palestinos como “de grande extensão”, mesmo quando se trata de apenas 250 metros.
Por outro lado, refira-se a ataques de morteiros palestinos como “ineficazes” ou “sem vítimas”, embora a intenção dos que atiram com os morteiros seja malévola.


Regra nº 2 – Suavize a violência palestina.

Não rotule as explosões de bombas e os tiroteios contra civis judeus como “terrorismo”, nem os perpetradores de “terroristas”. Diga “militantes” ou “ativistas”. Bombas plantadas no meio de mercados públicos israelenses não são “terrorismo”.

Manifestação de palestinos.


Justifique diferenças na abordagem. Por exemplo, ao referir-se a atentados do IRA como “terroristas”, a BBC News Online alegou: “Nosso noticiário doméstico sempre usou ‘terroristas’ para a Irlanda do Norte… mas a política do noticiário internacional é a de não qualificar ninguém nesses termos”. Segundo a editora da BBC Newshour, Maya Fish, “a palavra ‘terrorista’ nunca é usada em nosso noticiário internacional, não importa quem plante bombas, destrua ou mate.”


Regra nº 3 – Culpe os assentamentos judeus.

Atenue a agressão palestina chamando as vítimas israelenses de “colonos” e os locais dos atentados de “assentamentos” ou “territórios ocupados”. Designe os arredores de Jerusalém, como Gilo ou French Hill, por “assentamentos” e “enclaves de colonos” – ainda que esses locais sejam parte de Jerusalém há trinta anos e abriguem dezenas de milhares de famílias judias de classe média. Quando possível, também chame de “assentamentos” as cidades localizadas na Linha Verde*, como Sderot.

Vá além e refira-se a todas as vítimas judias como “colonos” – quer se trate de um garoto de quatorze anos ou de um bebê de dez meses.

Desumanize os residentes judeus de Jerusalém, da Cisjordânia e de Gaza reunindo-os em uma entidade civil ampla, como faz o The New York Times ao se referir a “soldados, colonos e civis israelenses”.


Regra nº 4 – Condene os líderes israelenses; solidarize-se com o Fatah e o Hamas.

Diga sempre de Netanyahu: “linha-dura”, “criminoso de guerra”, “repudiado pelos árabes” ou “demolidor”.

Nunca diga de dos políticos palestinos: “ex-terrorista”, “belicoso”, “corrupto” ou “despótico”.


Regra nº 5 – Culpe Israel por todas as mortes palestinas.
Culpe Israel, seja por “acidentes de trabalho” em fábricas de bombas palestinas, manifestantes atingidos por tiros palestinos destinados a soldados israelenses, ou feridos durante tumultos gerados por um atentado suicida ou uma explosão de ônibus.

Crianças israelenses que foram mortas em sua casa, enquanto dormiam, por um terrorista palestino.

Árabes mortos em acidentes automobilísticos também podem ser creditados a Israel. No começo de outubro de 2000, muitas versões culpavam os israelenses pelo espancamento seguido de morte de Issam Judeh Mustafa Hamed. Em 2 de novembro, patologistas indicados pela Autoridade Palestina concluíram que Issam Judeh havia morrido em um acidente de trânsito. É desconhecido o número de “mártires” que tiveram morte natural, ou foram mortos em acidentes e disputas internas.

Além disso, refira-se a crianças palestinas como traumatizadas, órfãs, assassinadas ou gravemente feridas – mesmo que pelas próprias balas ou bombas palestinas. Nunca mencione as crianças israelenses vitimadas pelos ataques palestinos.


Regra nº 6 – Empregue os verbos da maneira adequada.

Use a voz passiva para descrever as mortes palestinas – “foi morto a tiros” ou “foi abatido” por soldados israelenses.

Por outro lado, use o intransitivo para não evidenciar a culpa palestina. Diga que o tiroteio “irrompeu”. A manchete sobre a morte de Shalhevet Pass, o bebê de dez meses assassinado por um atirador palestino, dizia: “Criança judia morre na Cisjordânia”.

Quando possível, justaponha duas mortes, responsabilizando os israelenses por uma delas e deixando a outra sem autoria. Por exemplo: “Durante confrontos perto da aldeia de Dura, na Cisjordânia, um menino palestino de onze anos foi morto pelas tropas israelenses. Testemunhas dizem que o menino observava a troca de tiros entre soldados israelenses e atiradores palestinos, quando foi atingido no peito. Na segunda-feira, um bebê israelense de dez meses foi morto em tiroteio nas proximidades de Hebron”.


Regra nº 7 – Compense uma morte israelense, mencionando uma morte palestina sem qualquer relação com a primeira.

Compense uma atrocidade dos terroristas, como a explosão de um ônibus, com a morte de uma mulher idosa ou de uma criança palestina, mesmo que esta tenha ocorrido muito tempo antes da outra.
Noticiando a chocante carnificina de dois adolescentes israelenses perto de Tekoa, a CNN deu à matéria o título “Encontrados mortos dois adolescentes israelenses” e colocou logo embaixo a foto de um bebê palestino morto uma semana antes.

Em outra reportagem, a CNN noticiou: “Um israelense foi morto e outros ficaram feridos em atentados nas estradas da Cisjordânia nesta terça-feira. Os ataques aconteceram em seguida a explosões e confrontos em Gaza e na Cisjordânia que tiraram sete vidas palestinas”. Esse foi o relato, apesar das explosões em Gaza terem sido um “acidente de trabalho” em uma fábrica de bombas palestina.


Regra nº 8 – Invoque nomes árabes para os lugares santos.

Use termos árabes para os locais sagrados, mesmo quando o termo em hebraico for o padrão em qualquer enciclopédia, texto acadêmico, documento diplomático ou outra fonte aceitável no Ocidente.

Vista do Monte do Templo, que os árabes e grande parte da mídia chama de "Esplanada das Mesquitas".


Evite chamar o Monte do Templo de “o local mais sagrado do judaísmo”, ou Jerusalém de “a capital dos judeus há três mil anos”. Referências ao Monte do Templo devem ser qualificadas como meras pretensões: “que Israel reivindica ser o local do Primeiro e do Segundo Templos”.

De preferência, o Monte do Templo é “Haram al Sharif, o terceiro local mais sagrado dos muçulmanos”, ou “o lugar mais santo para os muçulmanos em Jerusalém”. Por contraste, nunca diga que Hebron, onde estão as tumbas dos patriarcas judeus, é “o segundo local mais sagrado do judaísmo”, nem que o sepulcro de Raquel, perto de Belém, é “o terceiro local mais sagrado para os judeus”.

Quando necessário, descubra um termo árabe bem obscuro, para aplicá-lo, por exemplo, à Porta de Jaffa, a entrada principal para a Cidade Velha de Jerusalém: “Bab al-Khalil”.



Regra nº 9 – Omita fatos que não se encaixem na narrativa "Árabes oprimidos, israelenses opressores" e não contextualize as informações.

Do início de 2011 até 17 de julho, mais de 160 foguetes foram disparados contra Israel - inclusive durante o peírodo de cessar-fogo e causando várias vítimas fatais. De 2001 até final de 2008 mais de 8600 foguetes foram lançados por palestinos.

No dia 11 de março de 2011 dois palestinos invadiram a casa da família Fogel no meio da noite e mataram a facadas pai, mãe e três filhos - um menino de 11 anos, outro de três e um bebê de 3 meses. O bebê foi decapitado (New Oriente Médio: Massacre em Itamar).

No dia 28 de setembro, durante o ano novo judaico, Asher Palmer (25) e seu bebê Yonatan morreram depois que o carro em que estavam perdeu o controle ao ser apedrejado por palestinos. Depois de morto o homem ainda teve seus objetos roubados pelos assassinos. (Israeli Father Asher Palmer, Baby Killed in Terrorist Attack)


Depois dos assassinatos os paletinos distribuíram doces nas ruas de Gaza comemorando o ocorrido (Gaza Residents Hand Out Candy to Celebrate Itamar Massacre).

Nenhum desses fatos foi publicado na grande imprensa brasileira. Mas quando jovens israelenses, revoltados com a violência palestina e a falta de resposta de seu governo, picharam "guerra" no muro de uma mesquita, o Jornal Nacional noticiou com estardalhaço os fatos. Sem informar a causa das manifestações ou motivo da escalada do setimento anti-árabe. Como se fosse apenas mais uma demonstração gratuita de intolerância e racismo.


Conclusão

Mesmo que não seja uma “conspiração”, estabeleceu-se uma “convenção” antiisraelense nos meios de comunicação. Como esse “manual de estilo” se desenvolverá nos próximos tempos? Tudo depende dos resultados dessa batalha que está sendo travada na mídia.

terça-feira, 13 de dezembro de 2011

The Year the Arabs Discovered Palestine

Judging from news reports, one might think that Palestinian nationalism has been active as long as Jews and Arabs have been living at the eastern edge of the Mediterra­nean Sea. And as Yasir 'Arafat rides high since his declaration of a Palestinian state, there is an understandable tendency in the West to accept at face value his insistence that the Palestinians have always sought an independent Palestinian state. In fact, this is far from the truth.

The idea of an Arab state resting between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea is, rather, a twentieth-century concept. In­deed, its origins can be traced with surpris­ing precision to a single year — 1920. In January 1920, Palestinian nationalism hard­ly existed; by December of that critical year, it had been born.

The events of 1920 encapsulate the current successes and tribulations of the Palestinian movement. They foreshadow some abiding themes, such as the potential for rapid change and the major role of the Western powers. They also provide insight into the most widely supported but possibly the least successful nationalist cause of this century.

Early 1920: The Heyday of Pan-Syrianism

Palestinian nationalism cannot be age-old. To begin with, nationalism itself origi­nated only in late eighteenth-century Eu­rope, and took hold among the Muslims even more recently. Until the early years of this century, the ancestors of today's Pales­tinians had thought of themselves mainly in terms of religion. Islam emphasized bonds between fellow-believers, allowing little scope for territorially-bound loyalties among Muslims. Like it or not, adherents of other religions also found themselves ar­rayed along religious lines. Coreligionists shared strong bonds, but they had few ties outside their own community. Religious lines became residence lines; except for spe­cific commercial or political purposes, little intermingling took place. A sense of com­mon political identity was entirely lacking. In addition to religious ties, loyalties were tied primarily to family; then came other genealogical relations, as well as some eth­nic, regional, linguistic, and class bonds.

When nationalism reached the Middle East from Europe, it captivated Middle Easterners as much as it did other peoples. The dream of governments embodying the spirit of their people was utterly alien, to be sure, but it excited many. The difficulty in the Middle East, as in most places, was exactly how to apply the national ideal. Where would the boundaries be placed? Did the Maronite Christians constitute a nation of their own? Did the Christians of the Levant? The Syrians? The Arabs? The Mus­lims? In the early years of this century, theorists took each of these peoples as the basis for grandiose plans for their favorite nation.

But not a single writer imagined a Pales­tinian nation, and for good reason. Palestine had always been, and at that time remained, a Jewish and Christian concept, utterly for­eign to the Muslims. Eretz Yisrael and Terra Sancta have no analogue in Islam. Muslims look to the Hijaz, not Palestine, for their most sacred landmarks. Further, there has never been an independent state in Palestine ruled by Muslims; such states that were brought into existence were ruled either by Jews or Christians.

Muslim distaste for the very notion of Palestine was confirmed in April 1920, when the British authorities carved out a Palestinian entity. The Muslims' response was one of extreme suspicion. They saw the delineation of this territory as a victory for the Zionists; in their more paranoid moments, they even thought it reflected linger­ing Crusader impulses among the British. The Zionists, by contrast, rejoiced at the formal defining of a Palestine, correctly seeing it as a major step on the road to Theodor Herzl's Judenstaat. (In other words, the term "Palestine," which today symbolizes the Arab rejection of Israel, served the Jews not long ago as the symbol of Jewish nationalism.)

This point cannot be overemphasized. Palestine was brought into existence by Brit­ish imperial authorities, not by Arabs; fur­ther, Muslims felt defeated by the British carving out of a distinct Palestinian entity. I know of no Palestinian endorsing this act when it took place in 1920. To the contrary, every recorded opinion suggests intense opposition.

What, then, was the objective of the Arabs living between the Jordan and the Mediterranean? What political unit did they endorse? To the extent that there was any proto-national unit to the east of the Mediter­ranean Sea, it was not called Palestine but Sham, the historic region of Syria which included the modern states of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan. This choice reflected a basic fact about the Levant, now often forgotten: Sham, usually translated as "Greater Syria," was a truly age-old ecolo­gical and cultural (but not political) unit.

Like Egypt, Arabia, Yemen, and the other large traditional units of the Middle East, it had geographic boundaries and ecological characteristics which made it distinct from adjoining areas. It constituted the western part of the Fertile Crescent, a dry region that supports life when—and only when—tended with great care. Residents of this area share a physical typology and an extended family structure. They speak Arabic with a distinctive lilt and prepare foods in a similar fashion. Just after World War I, a meeting of Arabs called for a united Syria on the basis that "the people speak Arabic; they are intermarried and have many links of kin­ship; and commerce has for ages moved freely between them."

Even so, Pan-Syrian sentiment was ex­tremely weak before World War I; Greater Syria was, after all, only a proto-nationalist unit. Europeans and Westernized Syrians often remarked on the absence of national solidarity. Testimony on this subject is unan­imous. The well-informed author of a Brit­ish travel guide to Greater Syria noted in the mid-nineteenth century that "patriotism is unknown. There is not a man in the country, whether Turk or Arab, Mohammedan or Christian, who would give a para [penny] to save the empire from ruin; that is, if he be not in government pay ... The patriotism of the Syrian is confined to the four walls of his own house; anything beyond them does not concern him." Gertrude Bell, a knowl­edgeable British observer, wrote in 1907 that "Syria is merely a geographical term corre­sponding to no national sentiment in the breasts of the inhabitants." K.T. Khaïrallah noted in 1912 that "Syrian society did not exist in the past. There was nothing but distinct and often hostile groups....Society was based on a despotism of brutal force modeled on that of the ruler."

By the end of World War I in November 1918, however, the notion of a Syrian nation had made considerable headway among the Arabs of Palestine. They agreed almost unanimously on the existence of a Syrian nation. With few exceptions, they identified with the Syrian Arab government in Damascus, headed by Prince Faysal, a member of the Hashemite family. Palestinian enthusiasm for Pan-Syrian unity steadily increased through mid-1920.

There is ample evidence for this enthusi­asm. Three major Palestinian organizations propounded Pan-Syrian ideas in the imme­diate aftermath of World War I: the Arab Club, the Literary Club, and the Muslim-Christian Association. (Note that none of these names makes any mention of Palestine.) The first two groups went furthest, calling outright for unity with Syria under Faysal. Even the Muslim-Christian Associa­tion, an organization of traditional leaders — men who would expect to rule if Palestine became independent — demanded incor­poration in Greater Syria.

The Muslim-Christian Association held a congress in January-February 1919 to draw up demands to submit to the Paris Peace Conference. Representatives of fourteen Palestinian cities and towns presented a peti­tion calling for Southern Syria to be "insep­arable from the independent Arab Syrian government." The congress declared Pal­estine "nothing but part of Arab Syria and it has never been separated from it at any stage." The delegates saw Palestine tied to Syria by "national, religious, linguistic, moral, economic, and geographic bonds." On the basis of this view, they called for a Palestine that would remain "undetached from the independent Arab Syrian Government."

Musa Kazim al-Husayni, head of the Jerusalem Town Council (in effect, mayor) told a Zionist interlocutor in October 1919: "We demand no separation from Syria." According to Ahmad ash-Shuqayri (the man who headed the PLO in the 1960s), the ubiquitous slogan of 1918-19 was "Unity, Unity, From the Taurus [Mountains] to Rafah [in Gaza], Unity, Unity." The same appeal echoed from all corners. A singer in Ramla encouraged her "enraptured listeners" to join Faysal's forces. From San Salvador, of all places, a protest in March 1919 went out from the "Syrian Palestin­ians" to international leaders calling for "no separation between Syria and Palestine" and expressing hope that "Syria and Pal­estine remain united." The Salvadorans de­clared: "We trust that if Syria and Palestine remain united, we will never be enslaved by the Jewish yoke."

A congress of Palestinians met in Damascus in February 1920 and strongly advocated Pan-Syrian unity. One speaker suggested that Palestine stood in the same relationship to Syria as Alsace-Lorraine did to France. According to a contemporary newspaper report,

'Izzat Darwaza spoke about Palestine and [the need for] Syrian unity, then he submit­ted a statement for general opinion. No one disagreed with him. The discussion pro­ceeded further on this matter; some partici­pants wanted not to mention Palestine but to use the expression Greater Syria for all the regions of Syria, and they were applauded.

The Congress passed four resolutions. The first of them noted that "it never oc­curred to the peoples of Northern and Coast­al Syria that Southern Syria (or Palestine) is anything but a part of Syria." The second called for an economic boycott of the Zion­ists in "all three parts of Syria" (meaning the whole of Greater Syria). The third and fourth resolutions called for Palestine "not to be divided from Syria" and for "the independence of Syria within its natural borders."

The crowning of Faysal as King of Syria in March 1920 elicited strong Pan-Syrian reactions among the Arabs of Palestine. The British military governor of Palestine re­ceived a petition (bearing Amin al­-Husayni's signature) that demanded the eradication of borders with Syria and the inclusion of Palestine in a Syrian union. Musa Kazim al-Husayni broke his promise not to engage in politics and spoke from the municipality building's balcony in praise of Faysal. 'Arif al-'Arif led a mass demonstra­tion in Jerusalem in which the participants carried pictures of Faysal and called for unity with Syria.

Then, in April, came the sobering news from San Remo that the British and French governments had decided to separate Pal­estine from Syria and to keep both territories under their control. This precipitated pro­tests from all parts of Palestine. New calls went out for the independence of a united Syria stretching from Turkey to the Sinai.

These and many other indications point to two indisputable facts: until July 1920, the Palestinian goal was to join in a union with Syria, while the aspiration of an independent Palestinian state barely existed. Matters changed quickly in the next few months, however.

Late 1920: The Rise of Palestinian Nationalism

The French conquered Damascus and scuttled the Arab kingdom ruled over by Faysal in July 1920. One result was that Syrians came to devote almost all their atten­tion to the issue of French rule, leaving very little time or concern for Palestine. Another was that, for Palestinians, the attractiveness of a Syrian connection faded away. Why be joined to Damascus, the Palestinians felt, if this meant rule by Paris? Palestinian leaders came to recognize that they were on their own against the British and the Zionists. From that point on, they sought to establish an autonomous Arab government in Pal­estine which would be ruled by themselves, not by politicians in Damascus. Herein lay the origins of Palestinian nationalism.

This reorientation was made formal by the Third Palestinian Congress, meeting in December 1920. Delegates at the Congress decided to drop the appellation Southern Syria and to stop demanding the joining of Palestine with Syria. At this moment, Pal­estine became acceptable to the Muslims; and it would not be long before they would actually find it appealing.

Subsequent meetings confirmed this new identity. When the Syrian Congress (the main exile organization dedicated to build­ing Greater Syria) met in August 1921, Pal­estinians would no longer endorse the unity of Greater Syria. They even compelled the organization to rename itself The Syro-­Palestinian Congress and to issue a state­ment calling for the "independence of Syria and of Palestine." A year later, Palestin­ians withdrew from this Congress.

This rapid switch suggests that, despite the apparent solidity of Palestinian interest in union with Syria, the sentiment was al­ways precarious. In large part, this has to do with the two sides, Syrian and Palestinian, having had different expectations. Prince Faysal, who, along with many Syrians in 1918-20, saw the Zionists as a less pressing danger than the Maronites of Lebanon, was willing to work with the Jews if they could help him achieve his Greater Syrian goal. In January 1919, for example, he reached an agreement with the Zionists. In return for Faysal's promise "to encourage and stimu­late immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale," he won Zionist backing for his campaign against the French. (But this agreement was contingent on Britain keep­ing France out of Syria; and since this was not done, the accord did not take effect.) Soon after, in a letter to Felix Frankfurter, Faysal noted that "there is room in Syria for both of us."

Palestinian leaders, in contrast, saw Zion­ists as the pre-eminent problem. In their eyes, Faysal's standing depended almost ex­clusively on his ability to help them against the Zionists. In late 1918, the Palestinians considered Faysal (in the words of a French diplomat) the only Arab leader "capable of resisting the Jewish flood" into Palestine. Faysal's subsequent willingness to deal with the Zionists diminished Palestinian backing for him.

This divergence in outlook created ten­sions between Syrian and Palestinian leaders from the moment World War I ended in November 1918. Signs of disaffection were apparent within three months of Faysal's arrival in Damascus, and they grew with time. Already in early 1919, the Muslim-Christian Association resolved that Pal­estine "should be part of Southern Syria, provided the latter is not under foreign con­trol." The Association's Jerusalem branch went farther, calling for an independent gov­ernment in Palestine to be only "politically associated" with Syria. It authorized Faysal "to represent Palestine and defend it at the Paris Conference," on the understanding that Palestine would enjoy full autonomy within a Syrian union. And while 'Arif Pasha ad-Dajjani, president of the Muslim-Christian Association, insisted that "Pal­estine or Southern Syria — an integral part of the one and indivisible Syria — must not in any case or for any pretext be de­tached," he also had doubts about rule from Damascus.

To be fair, it must be recorded that argu­ments against connections to Damascus ap­peared in the press as early as 1919. The Arab Club was the first nationalist institu­tion to abandon Faysal's leadership. Despite its name, the newspaper Suriya al-Janubiya ("Southern Syria") led the campaign away from Pan-Syrianism, arguing that Syrians had become too absorbed in their conflict with France to pay enough attention to the Zionist challenge. In January 1920, when Faysal returned empty-handed from his sec­ond trip to Europe, some top Palestinians began to see him as not essential to their cause, an impression reinforced by the lack of Syrian response to the Jerusalem riots of April 1920.

But these strains had only limited impor­tance. Syrian and Palestinian leaders effec­tively minimized their differences until July 1920, for both had an interest in Prince Faysal's success.

What accounts for the extremely rapid collapse of Pan-Syrian sentiment in Pal­estine? Yehoshua Porath, the leading histo­rian of Palestinian nationalism, argues in his 1974 book The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929 that Palestinians supported Pan-­Syrianism only as long as it served them but abandoned it when it no longer had utility. In contrast to Syrians, who tended to see Pan­-Syrianism as an end in itself, he says, Pales­tinians saw it as a means, a weapon in the battle against Zionism; it was weak because it only served ulterior purposes. Being treat­ed as part of Syria had three advantages in the years 1918-20.[xix] A joint Anglo-French declaration of November 1918 promised "to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia" — not Palestine. This declaration made it desirable for Pal­estine to be seen as part of Syria. Also, associating with the larger Muslim popula­tion of Greater Syria offered a way to over­whelm the Jewish immigrants demographi­cally. And alliance with Faysal gave Pales­tinians a relatively powerful protector.

According to Porath, the French conquest of Damascus caused these advantages to disappear:

Disappointment over the moderation of the Syrians toward Zionism cooled the Pal­estinians' enthusiasm for the idea of Pan-Syrian unity.... The orientation towards Damascus was based less on the growth of nationalism around this area [i.e., Greater Syria] than upon a given political situation. When this situation changed, the foundations of the Pan-Syrian movement collapsed.

All these points are correct, but not the implication that Pan-Syrian nationalism was merely a tactic while Palestinian national­ism appealed to deep sentiments. The re­verse is closer to the truth. Existing sentiments fitted better within Greater Syria than Palestine. Palestinians abandoned Pan-­Syrianism and replaced it with Palestinian separatism for tactical reasons, not out of heartfelt sentiment. Porath himself quotes one Palestinian leader who openly admitted this. Only days after the fall of Faysal's government, Musa Kazim al-Husayni de­clared, "after the recent events in Damascus, we have to effect a complete change in our plans here. Southern Syria no longer exists. We must defend Palestine." Kamil ad-Dajjani explained many years after the event that "the collapse of Faysal's rule in Syria and the disappointment of the hopes which were pinned upon that rule, made Palestinians feel that the orientation toward a Greater Syria bore no fruit." Palestinian nationalism originated not in spontaneous feelings but in calculated poli­tics, and a long time passed before the emotional appeal of this premeditated and novel allegiance matched that of Pan-Syrian nationalism.

In short, the Palestine concept served better than that of Greater Syria. It allowed the Arab leaders of Palestine to speak the same political language as the Zionists and the British. Rather than refer to some out­side source of authority, they could claim sovereignty for themselves. In the process, they evolved from provincial notables into independent actors. Thus, tactical consid­erations caused the rapid rise of Palestinian nationalism.

Ultimately, Palestinian nationalism origi­nated in Zionism; were it not for the exis­tence of another people who saw British Palestine as their national home, the Arabs would have continued to view this area as a province of Greater Syria. Zionism turned Palestine into something worthy in itself; if not for the Jewish aspirations, Sunni Arab attitudes toward Palestine would no doubt have resembled those toward the territory of Transjordan — an indifference only slowly eroded by many years of governmental effort. Palestinian nationalism promised the most direct way to deal with the challenge presented by Zionist settlers — a challenge never directly felt on the East Bank.

Amin al-Husayni

The career of Al-Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni (1895-1974), the long-time mufti of Jerusalem, dramatizes the switch from Pan-Syrianism to Palestinian nationalism.

Husayni began as a partisan of Greater Syria. He wrote sentimentally about ties between Syrians and Palestinians during World War I. When the Hashemites launched the Arab revolt, breaking the Otto­man Empire's four centuries' control over the Levant, Husayni saw this as a more effective way to block the Zionists. As Philip Mattar, a biographer of the mufti, writes: "Since it appeared futile for the Arabs to oppose British rule, Amin believed the only practical approach was to attempt to change the British Balfour policy by organizing mass support for reuniting Syria and Palestine, which would then work to­gether against Zionism."

Husayni therefore deserted the Ottoman army and joined the Hashemites. He then became a leading agent of the Hashemites (an ironic development in light of his later mortal enmity with this family), recruiting about 2,000 military volunteers in 1918 and working actively on Faysal's behalf in 1919. At the Palestinian congress in January-February 1919, Husayni called for unity between Palestine and Syria. A British dip­lomatic report noted that Husayni's activities were directed "in favor of union with Sharifian [i.e., Faysal's] Syria."

Husayni served as president of the Arab Club, which was especially eager for union with Syria. Toward the end of 1919, this group tent a letter to the British military governor of Jerusalem declaring that "Southern Syria forms a part of the United Syria beginning from Taures [and extending to] Rafa, the separation of which we do not tolerate under any circumstances, and we are as well pre­pared to sacrifice ourselves towards its de­fense with all our power."

Returning from Damascus on April 1, 1920, Husayni introduced a new element into an already tense atmosphere in Pal­estine by reporting (wrongly) that the Brit­ish government would be willing to recognize Faysal as ruler of Palestine as well as Syria. This report raised Pan-Syrian ex­pectations to a fever pitch. Then came the Nabi Musa riots in Jerusalem on April 4, when Arab mobs attacked Jews; according to Horace B. Samuel (and the British police report corroborates his account), these dis­turbances were initiated by two young men who shouted "Long live our King — King Feisul." Taysir Jbara, a historian, believes that Amin al-Husayni was one of these two. The police sought Husayni, but he fled to Damascus, where he again worked to spread the influence of King Faysal. Al­though a Palestine court had sentenced Hu­sayni in absentia to ten years in jail, the High Commissioner of Palestine, Sir Her­bert Samuel, pardoned him less than five months after the Jerusalem disturbances had occurred. This permitted Husayni to make his way back to Palestine after the fall of Damascus.

Faysal's defeat caused Husayni, like the other leaders, to change ideologies without missing a beat, turning into an un­bending Palestinian nationalist. He became mufti of Jerusalem in 1921, president of the Supreme Muslim Council in 1922, and pres­ident of the Arab Higher Committee in 1936. Each of these positions gave him new power; by the mid-1930s he had become the out­standing political leader of the Palestinians, the symbol and the bulwark of Palestinian nationalism.

Conclusion

Four major events occurred in 1920. In March, Faysal was crowned king of Syria, raising expectations that Palestine would join his independent state. In April, the British put Palestine on the map, dashing those hopes. In July, French forces captured Damascus, ending the Palestinian tie with Syria. And in December, responding to these events, the Palestinian leadership adopted the goal of an independent Palestin­ian state.

Having thus originated out of political calculus, not spontaneous feelings, Pales­tinian nationalism had to wait for many years to pass before it acquired real force. Still, what Palestinian nationalism lacked by way of natural origin, it soon made up for with passionate identification. How did a premeditated and novel allegiance come to exert so strong an emotional appeal? The logic of need caused Palestinian nationalism to flourish, and it became a popular cause.

So thoroughly has it come to dominate the current scene that its recent and util­itarian origins have been forgotten by all but a handful of scholars. To make matters worse, an informal campaign seems to be underway to suppress the fact that Pan-Syrianism predominated for two critical years. A number of solidly researched aca­demic books of recent years wave this whole phenomenon aside in an effort retro­actively to enhance the stature of the Pales­tinian nationalism of those years.

This rewriting of history serves to empha­size the abiding importance of 1920. A re­view of the events of that year points, first, to the fact that Palestinian nationalism is just one variant of anti-Zionism; in turn, others are always nipping at its own heels. Yasir 'Arafat and his followers can never rest easy, for they always have to contend with not only their Israeli enemy but also their Arab rivals. (Many of them are still based in Damascus.)

Second, 1920 demonstrates the extreme fickleness of the Arabs' nationalist loyalties. Only superficially grounded in nationalist sentiments, they found it easy to bounce from one formulation to another. Palestinian leaders supported the Greater Syria goal so long as it served their purposes; then, after the French capture of Damascus changed the premises, the leadership seamlessly adopted a new approach. During the 1950s, when Gamal Abdel Nasser and Arab nationalism were flying high, many of the Palestinian leaders moved into his camp. This could happen again. Were circum­stances to call for another switch, say, to federation with Jordan, many of those Pales­tinians who now fervently espouse an inde­pendent Palestinian state might take up this new aspiration.

While it is true that the flexibility of 1920 occurred at a moment of special fluidity, and positions have hardened since that date, the Middle East remains the world's most politi­cally volatile area. Major realignments take place almost predictably, about once a dec­ade. Given that today's constellation of forces is unlikely to last into the distant future and that an independent Palestinian state does seem forthcoming, the primacy of Palestinian nationalism could eventually come to an end, perhaps as quickly as it got started.

segunda-feira, 12 de dezembro de 2011

UNRWA : LORDS OF MISERY



According to UNRWA, a Palestinian " refugee " is someone who was living in the region of Palestine... two years before the state of Israël was born. This definition doesn't fit with international law. The grand son of a "refugee", born in another country, cannot be called "a refugee" himself. So, what is UNRWA's interest making sure Palestinians are not resettled ? That may be the key to this middle east conflict !

domingo, 11 de dezembro de 2011